

REMARKS
ON THE
SCIENCE OF HISTORY;
FOLLOWED BY AN
A PRIORI
AUTOBIOGRAPHY.



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CITOYEN PIERRE LEROUX,
REPUBLICAN AND PHILOSOPHER,
THIS VOLUME
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REMARKS ON THE
SCIENCE OF HISTORY.¹

THE SERIES BY NINES.

DESIRE, according to Buchez, the first President of the present French National Assembly, is a movement of the will, an outbreak, and energetic operation, of the active principle, toward something we have not as yet.

When we do not understand our desire, we are conscious of uneasiness, doubt, and trouble: as soon however as the intelligence begins to comprehend [vi] the blind appetency, a formula for it rises to the mind, and it becomes transformed at once into acceptance, hope, determinate volition, aspiration in view of an ideal, a conviction, a form of faith, a belief, &c.—*it become moreover a thesis proposed for reasoning*. Thus the movement for the comprehension of a desire, may be considered as containing the progress and completion of a distinct event, viz. the acquisition of a clearly defined sentiment; and, for this reason, that movement may be subdivided as follows: (1) The appetency, or longing tendency, toward something we do not possess, and of whose nature we have no clear apprehension, (2) The reasoning we institute within ourselves to discover the origin of our uneasiness—to discover also the object which is necessary for the satisfaction of our desires, (3) The full and conscious act of desire, which is the operation of instinctive tendencies, with an open knowledge of the object desired.

The progress of any event, in which men are actors, takes place always in three stages: the first is the great epoch of DESIRE, which is subdivided, as we have seen, into three sub epochs; the second is the great epoch of REASONING, wherein are discovered the ways and [vii] means by which the object necessary in order to the gratification of desire, may be obtained; and the last is the great epoch of EXECUTION or REALIZATION. The epochs of Reasoning and Execution, are, like that of Desire, each of them subdivided into three sub epochs—as shall be fully exemplified in the sequel.

These three Grand Epochs, each of which is composed of three sub epochs, form, when taken together, the great Logical Series by Nines, the series of Buchez.²

¹ The materials requisite for the construction of the "Remarks" and "Autobiography" contained in this book, may be found in the works of JACOB BOEHME, FABRE D'OLIVET and P. J. B. BUCHEZ:—The Author takes, therefore, this opportunity to protest against being identified, in the mind of any reader, with the hero of the supposed Autobiography.

² INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY, BY P. J. B. BUCHEZ.—2 vols. 8 mo. Paris, 1842.

No example, in illustration of the movement of this series, would carry so much conviction to the mind of the reader, as one that could be verified by each individual from his own private experience: such an example is possible for us, for the ordinary process of a religious experience, lends itself very readily for the purposes of scientific investigation, and, moreover, fulfills the requisite conditions. To test, therefore, the correctness of the serial order and movement, we will proceed to construct, by the *a priori* methods, a sort of imaginary [viii] spiritual Autobiography. And we shall take the liberty, for the sake of securing facility of composition, and avoiding circumlocution, to commence at once by speaking in the first person.—

The method of writing universal history under the form of a biography, and of writing biography under the forms of universal history, is philosophically correct.

As it was necessary for the race to go through the Mosaic dispensation, in order to become prepared for the reception of Christianity, so it was necessary for it to go through the Patriarchal dispensation, in order to become prepared for the religion revealed through Moses. In like manner, in the experience of the private Christian, the understanding of the Old Testament must pave the way for the understanding of the New. Every thing moves forward in regular progressions. He who *thoroughly* understands the present epoch, must have reproduced, and lived through, in his private experience, all the religions, dispensations, and civilisations, that preceded it.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, who has made a thorough study of this subject, says, in his remarkable [ix] essay on History: "There is a relation between the hours of life, and the centuries of time.—All inquiry into antiquity,—all curiosity respecting the pyramids, the excavated cities, Stonehenge, the Ohio circles, Mexico, Memphis, is the desire to do away this wild, preposterous There or Then, and introduce in its place the Here and the Now. It is to banish the *not me*, and supply the *me* Belzoni digs and measures in the mummy pits and pyramids of Thebes, until he can see an end of the difference between the monstrous work and himself When he has satisfied himself, in general and in detail, that it was made by such a person as himself, so armed and so motivated, and to ends to which he himself in given circumstances should also have worked, his problem is then solved Every step in private experience, flashes a light on what great bodies of men have done, and the crises in individual life, refer to national crises. . . . Every revolution was first a thought in one man's mind, and when the same thought occurs to another man, it is the key to that era. Every reform was once a private opinion, and when it shall be a private opinion again, it will solve the problem of the age We, as we read, must become Greeks, Romans, Turks, [x] priest and king, martyr and executioner, must fasten these images to some reality in our secret experience, or we shall see nothing, learn " nothing, keep nothing The student is to read history actively and not passively, to esteem his own life the text, and books, the commentary."

Jacob Boehme indicates, in his table of the Ten Forms of Fire, the most abstract movement of the series by nines. It is necessary that we should subjoin this table, dividing it off into epochs, according to the principles of Buchez:

THE TEN FORMS OF FIRE.³

POINT OF DEPARTURE.

FORM 1. The Eternal Liberty (having, and itself being, the Will) signified by *Shem*.

FIRST GRAND EPOCH. [*Desire.*]

FORM 2. The being Desirous, signified by *Arphaxad*.

FORM 3. The sharp Drawing, causing the opposite Will, signified by *Salah*.

FORM 4. The Flash, or Lightning, caused by the Liberty, and causing the Anguish, signified by *Eber*.

SECOND GRAND EPOCH. [*Reasoning.*]

FORM 5. Eternal Nature, or Great Mystery, whence the two Kingdoms proceed, signified by *Peleg*.

FORM 6. The two Principles of Fire (substance) and Light (manifestation), signified by *Regu*.

FORM 7. The Magia (self-acting Power) making its own Looking-Glass (self-consciousness:) as Life is of Fire and Water, signified by *Serug*.

THIRD GRAND EPOCH. [*Realization.*]

FORM 8. The Turba that breaks the Outward Life, Strength and Omnipotence, signified by *Nahor*.

FORM 9. The Virgin Tincture: Love Fire: Life of Angels and Holy Souls, signified by *Terah*.

FORM 10. The Entrance into the Holy Ternary, corporising of Angels and Holy Souls, signified by *Abram*.

This table will be fully explained in the Autobiography which follows.

[xi]

[x]

AN A PRIORI AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

³ See Notes A and B.

FIRST GRAND EPOCH. [DESIRE.]

Arphaxad.

FIRST SUB EPOCH:—*that of desire in desire.*

I was accustomed to attend church regularly. I became impressed, after a while, with the tenor of the preaching, and desired to be regenerated—to come into communion with God.—This sub epoch was characterised by a sentiment of dissatisfaction, a vague want of something, a desire after the Divine Life, while, in truth, I had many doubts as to whether any Living God existed. I wished to be regenerated, but questioned within myself whether the whole theory of religion were not the mere invention of some wonderful man, who promulgated it, not for any truth it contained, but on account of the benefits he conceived it would bring to the world. [2]

I read Lowth on Hebrew Poetry, the effect of which was to make me desire very earnestly to obtain that state of spirituality which was possessed by the Hebrew Prophets. I *endeavored*, therefore, willed earnestly (as a magnetizer wills when he wishes to put a patient to sleep,) to receive the Spirit, to be converted: so great were my efforts, and so unintermitting, that my physical system became deranged. I woke up once in the night, under a strong nervous excitement, and thought I saw tongues of fire hovering over the coverlet, like those which descended upon the apostles on the day of Pentecost.

I had a tooth-ache some days after this, and finding myself in a moment of faith, prayed to be relieved, on the strength of the promise in the gospel to the prayer of faith; and *was* immediately relieved. I prayed suddenly—before the access of belief could have time to pass away, and give place to doubt—and was relieved suddenly: this strengthened me very much.

I was engaged, about this time, on a matter of business that would secure me a considerable and permanent income, if I could bring it to a notable conclusion. Success, however, depended on so many contingencies beyond my control, [3] that I became altogether bewildered, and did not know what to do. At last a sermon in which Jacob's prayer was quoted, threw some light on my difficulties,—"Jacob vowed a vow, saying, if God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God: and this stone which I have set up for a pillar, shall be God's house: and of all that He will give me, I will surely give a tenth unto him." I also vowed a vow, in imitation of Jacob's, saying—If God will cause me to prosper in this business in which I am now engaged, I will devote to his service, year by year, one tenth of the permanent income I shall derive from it; and if he will regenerate me, and change my heart, then the Lord shall be my God.

Remembering that the Lord always makes use of means, I took what I considered proper measures for ensuring the success of my designs; nevertheless, the whole Matter

miscarried, and fell through. But this was what I had expected, for my faith this time was strong. I said God has done this to try me; for, if all had gone so easily, I should have supposed I had by my own shrewdness, accomplished the work; and thus I [4] should have been led to despise my vow: now, however, if the Lord sees fit to retrieve my affairs, I shall discern his hand in the work, and shall know he has accepted my vow, fulfilling on his part the conditions of the first clause of the covenant. And behold, in a few days, at the first effort I made, all came out according to my wish.

Salah.

SECOND SUB EPOCH:—*that of reasoning in desire.*

As the first stage is characterised by vague desire, so this stage is characterised by reasoning to render the desire no longer vague, but clear, and well defined, tending toward a known object.

In the course of reasoning instituted to discover the object of my desire, viz. the Living God, I laid down, at starting, the postulates which follow: (1) God is just, (2) God is absolute. I felt I could not love God, and thus come into communion with him, without first obtaining a knowledge of his existence, and, to a certain extent, of his character. But a war broke out between my postulates. The postulate, God is absolute, gave birth to a perfect system of necessity, and, if there was evil in the world, made [5] God the author of it. I felt that God had given me a certain character, according to his will; and had placed me in certain circumstances, still according to his will: this character, in concurrence with these circumstances, occasioned certain actions which I acknowledged to be wrong. But whose was the wrong? Mine?—Not at all: I was a mere passive agent in the hands of God, and if there was any wrong, it was attributable, not to me, but to the cause that made me act. But, says the Theologian, God will damn you if you act contrary to his *preceptive* will. I answer: —If, however, I act according to his *determinative* will, is not his preceptive will absurd, if it condemn my action? And, if I act according to his determinative will, not being able indeed, to do otherwise, being a mere passive instrument in his hands, and he damn me for violating his preceptive will—which he knows I cannot obey, and which he himself rendered it impossible for me to obey—is he not unjust?

I tried to reconcile this difficulty by supposing I might have been *free* in some former state of existence, from which I had fallen by my own free act, and that God—in some mysterious way which I could not understand,—was giving me a chance for restoration, and that I ought, for this [6] reason, to be thankful for existence without freedom. For still I sought communion with God, and it was my earnest desire to justify his ways.—This hypothesis was a mere reproduction of the doctrine which prevailed throughout India, Egypt, and Greece, in the second sub epoch of the first grand epoch of the world's history—the stage of reasoning in desire. This movement is half-shown, and half-concealed, in the doctrine of Plato that all our true knowledge is reminiscence—recollection of knowledge we possessed in some pre-existing state from which we have fallen: also in his argument for the immortality of the soul, based on the same dogma of

pre-existing life. The doctrine that this world is a *purgatory*, and that men are a race of fallen angels, pervaded all antiquity: but the world has moved forward since then, and the hypothesis satisfied me for a moment only.

What proof is there (I then proceeded to inquire) that there is any God at all? The argument from design proves nothing, for when we say we see *design*, we beg the whole question; for, without doubt, *design* implies a *designer*. Perhaps the powers of NATURE are adequate to the production of all the means adapted to ends which we discover in the universe. But, asks the Theologian, who made Nature? We answer, [7] who made God? If Nature be wonderful, and for that reason must have been produced, how much more wonderful is God! We always have to go back to that which is self-existing: and no one denies that there is something which is self-existing; but the question always presents itself: —Is this self-existing something alive, creative, providential, self-conscious? or is it a blind force that acts always according to immutable Law? Without doubt, matter is unlimited in extent, and, in this sense, infinite; and the forces of Nature mould it into an innumerable number of worlds. Would it be at all astonishing if, from the universal dice-box, out of an innumerable number of throws, there should be thrown out one world infinitely perfect? Nay, does not the calculus of probabilities prove to us that one such world out of an infinite number, must be produced of necessity? This world is indeed very far from being perfect. But, answers the Theologian, we have no issue here; for you acknowledge God, since you ascribe to Chance the attributes of God. Very well, I reply, but why darken counsel with words without knowledge?—the question is this, Is Chance—or God, if you are pleased so to call it, alive, providential? The God of the Theologians is not only creative, he is also alive, intelligent, good, self-conscious, just, &c. The evidence [8] from Nature, of the divine existence, did not seem to me to be conclusive; and that from the testimony and miracles of inspired men, seemed more than unsatisfactory. If God is good, I questioned, and has made a belief in him to be essential to our salvation, why has he not manifested himself more clearly to his creatures? Why has he made belief to depend upon evidence, and yet have given so few indications of his existence.

"This, I argued, is the conclusion of the whole matter: God—if he really exist—is good, alive, self-conscious, and governs all things according to his benevolent and holy providence; but the world shows no indications of such a benevolent and holy Providence. This earth appears to be a hell, or at best a planet condemned—a sort of purgatory: it is filled with violence, tyranny and injustice, and yet God, if he exist, is absolute sovereign, and has willed that things should be as they are!—Therefore there is no God.

Yet, I continued, if there be a Supreme Power [who is called God, though he violate constantly the rule of immutable right] his name deserves no reverence, and his power no respect. It belongs to him to damn me unjustly, and it belongs [9] to me to suffer the pains of Hell with fortitude, protesting, in the dignity of conscious rectitude, against the unholy usurpations of the tyrant of heaven. These are our relative positions: and I am in my true place, only when I exalt myself in my opposition, postulating myself as the personal enemy of Almighty God.—But if some are elected according to the Divine

Foreknowledge, from before the foundation of the world, to eternal joy and if these, led by self-interest, acquiesce in the decisions of Supreme Force, receiving an unending recompense in heavenly mansions—what then? Why then, these elect are of the earth, carnal, and while in heaven, will experience a heaven of the body, which they will appreciate, but a brutifying hell of the soul, of which, because of their earthly and unintelligent nature, they will be unconscious: while we, who are damned, will feel the corrosive fire in our outward frames, but a serene heaven within. The elect will be slaves, but the damned will be as Gods, so their intense pain will but exalt their essential divinity. Moreover, if some of the brethren in the Churches, and certain persons among the teachers and superintendants of the Sunday Schools, who seem to be ill high repute in the kingdom of heaven on earth, are to have like positions of authority in the kingdom of heaven [10] above, I should undoubtedly request respectfully to be permitted to go the other way. And I must confess that if the heavenly state is to be an infinite and uninterrupted orthodox prayer-meeting [for this is what is held up upon earth as its symbol] I have little or no taste for its enjoyments.

Having adopted these conclusions, I hoped that no Living God existed, but had misgivings. What was it most becoming in me, under the influence of these misgivings, to do? Evidently I must strengthen my soul, I must become inured to pain, I must possess an unbending will, I must train myself to bear infinite and unending pain; for, if God lived, I was sure of hell. If God lived, hell was my choice. I therefore began to train myself to mental and spiritual endurance: I became stern, unbending, and proud of my self-depending dignity.

At once, a whole theory of universal movement presented itself to my mind. I regarded myself as self-existing, though finite; I regarded myself as the true ground and origin of all my own forces, and exalted myself as a god in the strength of my own self-subsisting essence. I admitted, it is true, that other men were gods also—at least those of them who had internal force sufficient [11] to enable them to assert their divinity. Every object in nature was a god, but each stood in its own relative rank. I looked upon all things as distinct and separate substances. I did not believe in *one* substance, of which each individual partook; but held that each individual thing was separate, self-existing substance by itself and a self-existing substance is a god, by universal definition. To me, the forces seemed to inhere in the various substances, and each seemed to act from itself, by its own powers as a god. I believed in no Supreme God, nor in any Divine Order, but thought the universe to be one democratic republic, where each citizen (animate or inanimate) did the thing that was right in its own eyes. The Laws of nature were phenomena resulting from the action of these independent powers, but were nothing if considered in themselves. The universe being in operation, and all the powers exerting an activity, an order would prevail which would be a mere result of the prevalence of the stronger powers, taken in connection with the check which would be put on their operation by those which were weaker. Thus the order of nature was—not something to be *respected*, but something to be *created* by individuals. The individual was not to obey the order of nature, but to act out its own will, and thus create that order. [12] I felt myself to be a citizen of this republic, a god acting from myself, in concurrence with gods acting from themselves. I was capable of suffering, and so were most of them—at least

those were in whom I was most interested. It behooved me, therefore, to study their strength, that I might undertake no contest in which I should be vanquished: and it certainly behooved them to respect me in like manner. We were all independent gods; and there was no right but strength, and no proof of right but success. I was to respect them for my own good, so far as not to undertake anything in which I should miscarry; but, whatever I did, I did it from my own will, and for my own sovereign good pleasure. There was no truth except what some force made to be truth: and truth changed as different powers obtained the ascendancy—for there were as many truths as there were powers in the world. I had my truth, and, in proportion to my ability, I imposed it upon others. I was a god; and, if I could have attained to govern the whole universe, my will would have been the rule of universal truth,—what was the so called Supreme God; if not a being of the same order with myself, only transcendently powerful? At all events, my truth reached as far as my power reached. Henceforth, I would measure myself with any power which [13] should bring what purported to be truth, and the measure of power would be the measure of truth. I made, therefore, my religion to accord with the good pleasure of my will, and prepared to maintain it by force. The Supreme God, if he existed, could damn me in hell, and his power was sufficient to keep me there: but he had no power over my will. Here I could defy him. In hell, the war between power and power would continue: my body would indeed be subdued, but in my soul I would defy him. I would still retain sovereignty in the sphere of the mind: for where I have power to reign, there I was lawful sovereign.

I looked upon nature, and saw that all the unintelligent, and inanimate powers, were inexorable. The sun attracted the planets exactly to the extent of his attractive force, and the planets obeyed just so far as they were obliged so to do; and they resisted in the exact measure they were enabled to resist by their own centrifugal force. All things exacted to full measure of their dignity: they obeyed in resignation and silence when the balance of force was against them, and exacted obedience to the extreme measure of their prevailing force, when the balance of power was in their favor. God was inexorable, punishing [14] every violation of his will; for every transgression brought its exact recompense of punishment. Throughout the universe, all was stern, inexorable, merciless.

I asked, what is the true course for me to follow, placed as I am, a god among gods? I answered thus: I am a substance that may be viewed under two aspects; for I am (1) a substance exerting power over other substances, and capable of inflicting suffering on them; I am also (2) a substance upon which other substances exert power—upon which other substances inflict pain. I must train myself, consequently, (1) To the habit of prompt, inevitable, inexorable execution, and, (2) To the habit of patient, uncomplaining endurance.

In execution, therefore, I will be prompt. I will have no misgivings; and my authority over another shall be measured by my power of inflicting suffering upon him. I will study how I can make men suffer. I will be merciless, and will pursue my enemy as far as comports with my safety. If it is dangerous to kill him—if I am in a country where laws prevail—I will shed no blood; but if no danger to myself intervene, then will I kill him as I would kill a dog. My eye [15] shall know no pity. I will have no rule of conduct other

than a cold and deliberate calculation of the chances of ultimate success. I will no longer investigate the fantastical principles of what are called wrong and right, but will study how far rapid execution, under the circumstances of the present age, and state of the world, will enable me to inflict suffering upon men.

But, I asked, how will I be able to sustain the harrassing war which I shall be obliged to carry on, if my hand is thus openly lifted against every man, and every man's hand against mine? I answered in this way:—My demands shall be moderate; I will be willing to be poor, to live unobserved by men, and to be satisfied with what is necessary for the wants of my body. I will endeavor to avoid envy, and will wound no man's feelings; I will be kind and courteous to all, the friend of the poor, and the enemy of none but the rich and the insolent; and I will always maintain the cause of the weak against the oppressor. If I act thus, who will desire to injure me? Who, except the tyrants and oppressors, will ever oppose me?

And thus will I cause the opposition of tyrants and oppressors to cease, so far as I am concerned: [16] —I will imitate the inexorable powers of nature: if a man act against those powers, he will suffer the consequence; he that treads upon fire will be burned, he that falls in the sea will be drowned. It is of no avail to humble one's self before fire or water; for the natural powers are inexorable. I also will be a fire to my enemies; I will be inexorable, cruel, merciless, without human feeling—nay, on the contrary, I will exult in the suffering I inflict. To my enemies, supremacy and revenge shall be the law and aim of my life. If expediency keep me quiet for a while, the will for swift retribution shall never slumber: by day and by night, will I repeat to myself that I have not yet obtained full vengeance. As the stars move regularly and inevitably in their courses, so will I move regularly and inevitably to my revenge. Human feeling shall have no place in me, but give way to the calculus, when I think of my enemies. My resolution, making allowance for the difference in the state of civilization, may be well expressed in the words of Lamech:

Adah and Zillah, hear my voice!
Ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech!
For the least wrong done unto me, I will kill;
For a wound I will kill a man,
For a deadly wound I will kill a child even;
For if Cain avengeth himself sevenfold, [17]
Surely Lamech shall avenge, himself seventy and sevenfold.

I was now in the movement of private experience which corresponds to the great movement of the Chaldean civilization. The Chaldeans, according to the prophet Habakkuk, were "a bitter and hasty nation, a people imperious and self-willed, whose judgments and decrees proceeded from themselves."

The prophet says of them:

He is a proud man, neither keepeth at home,

He enlargeth his desire as hell,
And as is death—and cannot be satisfied.

And again:

They shall come up, all of them, in troops, for violence:
Their glance is ever forward!
They gather captives like the sand!
They scoff at kings,
And princes are a scorn unto them.
They deride every strong hold:
They cast up mounds of earth and take it.—
Then his spirit renews itself,
He transgresses and is guilty;
FOR THIS HIS POWER IS HIS GOD.

Indeed, according to Buchez, this Chaldean' civilization preceded that of India and Egypt. [18] Buchez has a convenient method of discovering the civilization of the nations whose history has been forgotten, a method consisting in a simple application of the rule of three. All progressions may be counted either forward or backward; if they increase in one direction, they must, of necessity, decrease in the other. The civilization of India and Egypt, was one of *relative inequality*, being founded on the dogma of a fall; the civilization of Christianity is one of *equality*, for it is founded on the dogma of a redemption. From the Christian point of view, no man can be regarded as having fallen below the level of humanity, for Christ died for the sinner more especially: neither can any man be regarded as having raised himself altogether above the level—for it was necessary that Christ should die for this man also.

Now—to apply the series—as the Indian and Egyptian dispensation is to the Christian, so is the Christian dispensation to—what? Verily we are not prepared to say.

But this is taking the series in its increasing direction; let us reverse it, and endeavor to find the character of the dispensation which *preceded* that of India and Egypt.—As the Christian civilization is to that of India and Egypt, that is, as [19] *equality* is to *relative inequality*, so is the civilization of India and Egypt to the truly primitive civilization, that is, so is *relative inequality* to—what? Buchez answers, to *absolute inequality*, to the state in which the human race was divided into two classes, MORTAL MEN, and MORTAL GODS.

The Goths considered themselves to be a nation of gods, and their national name indicates as much, since (as Fabre d' Olivet shows in his philosophical history) the words *god* and *goth* come from the same root. The higher classes in Greece, Rome, and, indeed, almost every country, claimed to be descended from the gods. The Roman Senate claimed to be a body of divine men. This civilization, which has left its traces, not only in Greece and Rome, but also in the movement of our present epoch, was in its highest splendor in the most ancient times—times now almost forgotten by the historian. In those days, men lived, to a certain extent, in *community*, not in that *association* in the harmony of christian

love, to which we look forward now, knowing that paradise, and the garden of Eden,⁴ are before us, [20] and not behind us in the past, but in a communism based on the mere knowledge of material interests—for the philosophy of this epoch was materialism, Sabianism. The Peruvians, who were governed by a dynasty of mortal gods, and who were in this form of civilization when their empire was destroyed, held all their lands from the crown. The manufactories of Babylon were carried on, in a certain manner, in community. In those days were built the great pyramidal towers, and the cyclopien works which astonish the traveler in Europe and Asia. In those days, a species of slavery prevailed, infinitely more atrocious than anything that has since existed on the face of the earth: for then gigantic labors were accomplished under the eye of a stern despotism, which would have been impossible in any other state of society. At that time were built the tower of Babel, and those eternal vestiges of tyranny, the pyramids of Egypt. The worship of this epoch was conducted on towers and pyramids, with human sacrifices. This worship, carried everywhere in the old world by the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, was reproduced in Mexico, under the Aztecs, where human sacrifices were offered on the platforms on the top of the pyramidal towers—the victims being first slain, and then rolled down the great flights of steps. [21]

The Chaldean worship was that of the inexorable powers of Nature—if worship it could be called: and their religion consisted, not in the service of the Living God, but in an endeavor to bring the occult powers of nature under the control of the human will. Their priests were wizards, and their ceremonies were the ceremonies of magic, a term derived from the word *Magian*, the title attributed to the priestly caste. This age was fruitful in heroes and tyrants of the camp of Nimrod, the hunter of men; but it produced no inspired prophets; for there is no inspiration where men recognize no living and self-conscious God, superior to themselves. The Chaldeans had an abundance of magicians, wizards, soothsayers, and witches, in whom the blind impulse of nature originated oracular speeches, but no prophet.

I had become—in this second sub-epoch of desire—a perfect Chaldean; for I worshiped, with blind devotion, the dead god of the Babylonians, viz: the active powers of nature operating according to the laws of necessity. I looked upon myself as a mortal god, and upon the frequenters of the churches as men. I had no hesitation in affirming within myself that there was an infinite gulf between men, and a mortal god like myself. [22] Indeed, if I had received power at this time, I should have made a tyrant after the order of Nimrod. I cannot express the contempt I felt for those whose mean, ungenerous spirit, led them to acquiesce in the popular worship, through fear of hell. If I had held them in my hands, I would have crushed them without mercy, for I should have considered the greatest degradation as the condition most appropriate to them: yea, an oppression that would have destroyed them, would have found favor in my eyes. The world, by their destruction, might become a fit abode for the mortal gods, and a fit sphere for the display of generosity and god-like sentiment. In a world thus purified, exaltation of character might become the standard and measure of human dignity. And what generous, high-minded man, who held a mean-spirited, fawning, servile wretch in his power, a wretch always accessible to the motive of fear, and never accessible to any

⁴ He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches! To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midst of the PARADISE of God. *Rev.* 9: 7.

higher motive, would consider him fit for any position, save that of the vilest slave. Is there any communion possible between a worm, and a mortal god?

But I always retained some lingering doubt of the truth of this system: I always feared that there might indeed exist a Divine Tyrant who had power to damn in hell. If my Chaldean doctrine [23] were true, then probably I should not exist at all after death. Perhaps I should join the universal force that moves the worlds, and become lost in the general flood of electricity, or gravitation. Like would go to like. Every particle in my physical frame would go into new combinations with other matter, and the soul would return to the original force from which it emanated. Perhaps I might, in my future state, assist unconsciously in keeping the moon in her orbit. But if this doctrine were not true, if there were indeed a Living God in heaven, then hell was my portion. In that case, I saw hell at the end of my course, and I welcomed it. I frequently imagined myself in hell, a serene god, notwithstanding the burning brimstone; and I gloried in the force of my will.

The culture that resulted from all these reflections, may be summed up in two points. (1) I trained myself to a cruel, inexorable mercilessness, a suppression of all human feeling toward those whom I held to be my enemies. (2) I trained myself to spiritual strength and power of endurance, to contempt for the sufferings of the body, that I might, hereafter, when in hell, be able to rise serenely above the torments to which my earthly frame would be subjected, and calmly assert my essential divinity. [24]

I succeeded very well in this course of education of the will, for I acted on the true maxim:—"If a man wishes to possess a certain character, let him act as though he were already possessed of it, and he will possess it " I acted as though I were merciless, and I became merciless: I acted as though I were able, with serenity of soul, to endure all physical pain, and, at last, I came to believe that no suffering could conquer me. This capacity of enduring pain was the main point; for when I came to feel that I could be damned without flinching, I was at peace. What cared I for the future?—I felt that I commanded my own soul, and enjoyed happiness that nothing could take from me. All the misery of the body, because it was of an inferior order, could never equal the joy of my soul. Let misery be piled mountain high upon the outer man, the difference would be in favor of the soul, and would be clear joy.

Eber.

THIRD SUB EPOCH:—*that of execution in desire.*

This is the sub-epoch in which a clear and distinct notion of the object desired, is *actually* obtained: this sub-epoch closes, therefore, the great movement of desire. [25]

One evening, in the spring of 1839, I was walking, about a hundred yards in front of the house in which I lived, when suddenly, upon turning to go back, I fell—I felt no pain, no sickness of any kind, and immediately rose again to my feet. I fell again, though still without pain or sickness, and this time I found it difficult to rise. I then crept, as well as I could, on my hands and feet, into the house, got into bed, and went to sleep. In the morning I began to feel very ill, and sent my servant for assistance. The doctor came soon, and bled me in the arm, informing me that I had a remittant fever. I grew quite ill afterward, and remained several days confined to my bed, with my energies, both mental and physical, completely prostrated. During this time, I was too unwell to think at all, and almost too unwell to remember anything.

After a while, I recovered, and walked about a little in the fresh air. This motion enlivened me, and I began to feel the operation of the vital force, so that I felt almost well. I immediately began, with my renovated strength, to carry on that education of the will which was now the main occupation of my life. I endeavored to imagine myself suffering the torments of hell, and rising superior to them through the force of spiritual [26] energy: I endeavored to put myself into the position of unflinching defiance. But it was all in vain, my mental energies were still prostrated by the remains of my fever. I felt no elasticity of will, I had no energy, wherewith to hate, I could not raise a feeling of defiance. I still thought God to be a tyrant, but all my opposition to him was prostrated. I could no longer carry on the war. These reflections then passed through my mind:—Fever depends on the state of the body, no effort of will can save any man from it: *what if God should first give me a remitting fever, AND THEN DAMN ME IN MY STATE OF CONSEQUENT PROSTRATION*, would he not then conquer both body and soul? The empire of my soul is then not mine;—God rules there as well as in the body. I, who acknowledge no right but prevailing might, am then conquered by might—I am driven from my last strong hold. I can defy even, only by permission, and only by strength given me by the superior power whom I defy. What a mockery of my Supreme Sovereignty in my own self-subsisting essence is this. If I submit, I am a slave; if I defy, I am still a slave. I have no independant action; I am a victim, not only according to the outer, but also according to the inner man. [27]

But God (and this reflection impressed me profoundly) is evidently not then a power of the order I supposed. The Devil is a power of that order, and, if I rebel against God, he will bring me under the tyranny of the devil. If the devil and I are gods, then God is more than god; for he is independant of us, while we are victims in his hands, dependant for all things upon him. Necessity reigns then within as well as without.

Three things I had supposed to be distinct, (1) God, (2) Myself, an individual substance like God, though less powerful, and (3) The Rule of Right, established by the prevalence of the stronger powers of the universe. I had endeavored to establish the rule of right in opposition to God, by conquering him in the sphere of my own soul. But how were all these high thoughts abased! God was superior to all substances, for they vanished at his presence. There was no liberty where he came, for he was all and in all. He gave powers according to his pleasure, and powers prevailed according to his pleasure, and thus he created the rule of right according to his pleasure. How could I pretend to put him on trial—how could I pretend to judge him according to an immutable rule of right, when he himself created that very rule of right (and, consequently [28] was able to change it) according to his good pleasure? I was indeed conquered—annihilated. I felt as though I were at the entrance of some dark and mysterious cave, where the essential being of my soul was momentarily created by the dim vapors that exhaled from the mouth of the abyss. I seemed to have no real and substantial existence, and, from this moment, I lost faith in myself. I seemed no longer to be a free agent in any sense. Outwardly, I was acted upon by external circumstances, and inwardly, it was not I that willed, but God who formed my feelings, thoughts, passions, state of mind, in such a way that I merely appeared to will. I had exalted myself in my pride, but now there was no *I* to be proud—*I* was annihilated. I, as a separate substance, a person, vanished at once; and all separate substances, all persons, vanished with me, leaving God alone as the sole foundation of the universe, with all visible things as the mere phenomena of his sole and sovereign activity.

In fact, if God be ABSOLUTE, and the sole self-existing Power, he does all that is done in the world. For if anything be done by the creature, it is done, either (1) by God himself, who uses the creature as a mere instrument, or (2) by the creature, through virtue of some power he possesses [29] independent of God. But, if the creature possess any power independent of God, he is so far *self-existing*—a conclusion which is absurd by the hypothesis. God created the creature, and, if the creature do anything by means of energy imparted in the act of creation, it is God that does it, for the power comes from God: and, if the creature afterward perform any act, it is God who performs this also, for, if God did not continue to impart strength by his preserving energy, the creature would return to its original state of non-existence. If God create, and the creature continue in existence after the creation; it is through the power of God sustaining it: if it can continue without the sustaining power of God, then there is some independant force in the creature itself, or in nature—which is contrary to the hypothesis that God is the only self-existing being. If the creature perform any act which is not a direct or indirect act of God himself, then there is some force in existence independent of God, for if God did not do it, some other force did—but the hypothesis leaves no room for any force independant of God. The hypothesis that God is absolute, leads necessarily to *Pantheism*: there is no way of avoiding this conclusion. God could not have created man an independent being; for the facts of creation and independence, exclude each other. [30] The theory of evil being merely *permitted* by God, is unspeakably absurd; for, if he permits any act, he either does the act himself, or some other power, who is not God, does it; but no other power, which is not God, can possibly do any thing whatever; for then there would exist an operative power, acting from itself, independently of God, a power of the Divine Order, only

weaker—which is absurd by the hypothesis that God is absolute. The doctrine, therefore, of the Divine Absolute Sovereignty—which is identical with that of an Absolute Creation of all things out of nothing—originates a system of Pantheism.

The same method of reasoning annihilates every rule of right supposed to be independent of God. For the rule of right is nothing more than the way in which God manifests his will—for, if there be any other rule of right, it is the manifestation of some still superior will, or else it is an existence independent of God, which independent existence would be another God, which is absurd. The rule of right is the sum of the unvarying laws of nature: who ever thought of questioning the justice of *nature*? Now God created nature, and thus created its laws and relations: and he might have made it altogether different if he had pleased. He might have given [31] man another nature, and then another thing would have been right for man from what is right now. When God created individual things, he created their natures, and thus he created right and wrong; for right for any individual being is what is according to the nature of that individual being, and wrong is what is contrary to that nature. Again, that may be stated to be right, or wrong, universally, which is in accordance with, or contrary to, the universal order of nature. But God, since he created nature, is anterior to, and above, all nature; for if we say *he* has a nature, we say there must have been a God superior to God—for there must have been a God to originate this higher nature, all of which is absurd. God has no nature, and, for that reason, we say he is neither good nor bad, moral nor immoral; for he transcends all distinctions of right and wrong, seeing he is anterior to, and above, all right and wrong, he having created all right and wrong according to his good pleasure.

We acknowledge all this when we deny the justice of God, for we deny that justice in this way: we examine *the determinative will of God* as manifested in nature, and call that right—why right? because it is in accordance with the nature which the creator has been pleased to give [32] to created things. We then examine *the preceptive will of God*, and, if we find a discrepancy between this and the determinative will, we say God is unjust. But which God is it that we affirm to be unjust? Evidently the author of the preceptive will: for no living man ever dreamed of attributing injustice to the author of the determinative will that is, to the God who manifests himself in nature. But what does all this mean? It means that we look upon any system of religion which stands in conflict with the evident revelations in nature, as an imposition: it means that we deny the existence of this new God, who is set forth as the author of a preceptive will opposing the determinative will of the true God (for an unjust God is no God at all) and that we characterise the preachers of the religion of this imaginary God, as fanatics or impostors.

I tried to oppose these conclusions, by saying it was disgraceful in me to submit to mere force: but what could I do about it? I had fought my ground inch by inch like a man, and when I made my last stand, I was instantly defeated. There was no use in disguising the matter, I was conquered. Look where I would, there was no point of shelter. I was indeed willing to carry on the war, but where could I find a field for contest? [33] I could not fight for the sovereignty of the outward man, for how could I insure myself against disease, poverty, oppression, injustice, or even justice, when it was administered by a higher power. And how should I endeavor to assert sovereignty in the sphere of truth? I

could no longer disguise from myself the plain fact that truth was truth, whether I darkened my eyes to it or not—whether I withheld my assent or not. Ought I to endeavor to assert sovereignty over my own will? I had *tried that!* God held me in his hand, and all my feelings, passions, determinations, were exactly as he willed they should be—over my feelings of fiercest defiance. I would have fought longer, but saw it was of no avail, for evidently my course was irretrievably ruined.—Suppose it be disgraceful for me to submit—is there any other course open for me? How shall I hold out longer? What can I do?—So I submitted at once, as to a superior force.

Then I said, why not submit with a good grace? Suppose a great conqueror, Napoleon for example, should invade a country and conquer it, and should make a proclamation, while the conquered people were in despair of ever retrieving their condition, and thought of emigrating, showing that although he intended to rule arbitrarily, [34] and to deprive them of their political rights, he would yet so arrange matters in other respects, that they would be better off, and happier, than they were before—would it not be wiser for this people to submit and make the best of their circumstances? But suppose they continue to fight? But they cannot continue to fight, for the invading army is overwhelming by the hypothesis. But if, at some future time, they should become strong enough to begin the fight again? Very well: let them fight when they gather more strength, for then the conditions of the question will be altogether changed, but let no man contend against evident necessity. I cannot contend against God, and it is for my advantage to submit: I will submit therefore, like a conquered province, to hard necessity.

Again, I asked, is even this wise. If a man be a slave, without hope of freedom, he ought to submit, to adapt himself to his condition without murmuring at his lot; but if, by killing his master, he may obtain freedom—by all means let him kill his master. We may reason as we please about the inalienable right of all men to freedom; but, if any one be deprived of it by superior power, let him not feed himself on abstractions, but [35] wait patiently until he sees opportunity of doing something with prospect of success. It is of no use to contend against overwhelming force. Now—when I have been overcome by Supreme Might, and see no chance for escape, but am made a servant, an instrument in the hands of Supreme Power—why not resign myself to my fate, and adapt myself to my condition as servant and instrument? So I gave in my final, but still reluctant submission: then I said,—I am a fool, and have been a fool all along! God is not of my nature, and, by submitting to God, I come under no tyranny; for tyranny is an authority, depending on mere force, that is exercised by a being upon *his equals*, upon those of a like nature with himself. The rule of monarchs, the rule of the devil over the damned, is tyranny: but the rule of God is not tyranny, for it does not partake of a political or governmental character—it is not a rule of authority. God is not a governor of the universe, for a governor rules over those of a like nature with himself, and exercises a political and judicial power, while God exercises a creative, a preserving, and a determinative power of an altogether different kind. If I am a servant of God, I am under no tyranny; for God does not govern, but supports, sustains, and directs, me. It is the rule of the devil that is [36] tyranny; and I must submit to God, or come under the tyranny of the devil. I must be, either the servant of God, or the bond slave of the devil: and even as the slave of the devil, I can not escape God, for he created, sustains, and preserves all, and therefore rules

all and in all. Thus I was enabled to submit with more satisfaction to myself, but it came hard after all; for I had supposed myself to be a free citizen of the universe, a peer of God, and was loth to lay down my divinity.

Thus the great epoch of desire was consummated in the discovery of the object that was desired, viz: the Absolute God, the Author of all Existence, THE ETERNAL FATHER.⁵ Henceforth, I had only to follow down the great religious dispensations which had been given from time to time to men: for my problem, henceforth, was the discovery of the means whereby I might obtain communion and fellowship with the FATHER. The great object of desire, in the whole series, was communion with God, and the great epoch of reasoning, was, therefore, to be taken up with investigations relating to that *communion*: but the object of desire in the isolated grand epoch of [37] desire, was, to clear up the blindness which attached to the movement of the instinctive tendencies, so that the desire might be no longer blind, but open and full by reason of a clear knowledge of the object desired. I now knew, by reason of this experience in the first grand epoch, what it was that I really desired, viz: communion with God—but I had no knowledge whatever of any means by which such communion might be effected. The next grand epoch subdivides itself, therefore, as follows: (1) Full and open desire for communion and fellowship with God, (2) Reasoning upon the means whereby such fellowship might be effected, (3) Discovery of these means. [38]

⁵ See Note C.

SECOND GRAND EPOCH. [REASONING.]

Peleg.⁶FIRST SUB EPOCH:—*that of desire in reasoning.*

I had submitted reluctantly, but soon became satisfied with my new position, and desired honestly, heartily, earnestly, and truly, to find the way in which I could serve God acceptably. I knew that the one absolute God, the Eternal Father, existed; and I desired to have fellowship with him. But how should I, the finite, come into relations with him, the infinite? How could any communion be rendered possible between me and the absolute God? I felt myself to be indeed nothing. There was no communion between God and me; for there was no kindred, no likeness of nature, between us. What communion could I [40] have with him while I was a mere instrument in his hands? I was less than a slave, how then could I have fellowship with him?—for a certain equality is a prior requisite for all fellowship: and an instrument in the hands of another, can evidently never have fellowship with that other. I felt myself to be a puppet in the hands of God, with God behind me, I not seeing him, while he pulled, as it were, the wires by which I was made to act. Outward circumstances operated upon me according to his will, and not according to mine; and within, God created momentarily my appetencies, tendencies, passions, according to his own will. He could alter the outward circumstances, leaving the inward tendencies and passions as they were, and my conduct would be changed as he willed: on the other hand, he could alter the inward tendencies, leaving outward circumstances as they were, and my conduct would be changed in like manner: again, he could alter both the inward and the outward, the subjective and the objective, always performing his irresistible will. He created me with a certain character known to himself, and placed me in the world at a certain epoch of history, under a certain order of society, h, certain circumstances; and these arrangements of his Providence operated upon me, according to my original character, producing a course of [41] life which was *necessary*—which might have been computed beforehand by one who had the conditions of the problem given. What was I then? A mere victim in the hands of God.

Still I desired to have fellowship with God, if such fellowship were indeed possible. I resolved solemnly that I would endeavor to find out which religion, among the innumerable systems which divided his worshippers, was the religion of God; and, in case I succeeded in finding it, I determined to live according to it. I would make this mischief work. If I found Christianity to be true, I would live according to the precepts of the gospel; if Mahometanism, I was perfectly ready to turn Turk; if Judaism, I would conform to the religion of Moses—whatever religion I found to be the religion of the Absolute God, that religion I would embrace.

About this time, I was very much interested in Shakespeare, and once, after reading all the morning, when I closed the book, I found myself sympathising with, and pitying,

⁶ That is, *Division*:—"the name of one was PELEG, for in his days was the earth *divided*." *Genesis*, 10—25.

the villain of the play. This opened my eyes to the depravation of character I had undergone by reason of my speculations. I saw at once, that all this must be cured, that I ought to cultivate better [42] feelings. So I shut up every book that gave food to perverse passion, or that could be made (as Shakspeare, for example) to furnish such food, and opened the Bible, and began to study the New Testament and the Prophets.—Not that I believed the Scriptures, but that I knew I should find in them the proper food for my moral nature. I disbelieved the doctrines of the Bible, but revered its ethics: So I set myself earnestly to the task of encouraging better, and less murderous feelings—not forgetting to strive night and day to discover the religion of God.

Formerly, I had refused to look for the truth, supposing I myself, as a god, could create all the truth that was requisite for my own purposes. I had supposed that what I willed was truth, so far as I had power to make it so. When, therefore, I had investigated any subject, I had done it not to discover what was true, but to measure power, and to see how far I could oppose that which was displeasing to me. But now all this was changed. I saw now that truth was what was in accordance with Divine Order. I saw that if I would find what really existed, I must examine dispassionately. I must not allow myself to be swayed to one side or the other by my desires. I must not look into myself to see what accords [43] with my wishes, but must go far away from myself, and examine the facts of the case calmly, whether they are pleasant to me or the contrary. Formerly, I had tried to see how much I could help believing, but now I tried to see how much I could find a rational ground to believe. I was seeking for truth, and desired to learn and believe as much of it as possible. I had rather believe too much (but there was little danger of that,) and be mistaken in some things, than not to believe enough. In fact (I said) if I try not to believe, I shall never know the truth at all; while, if I try to believe, I shall probably learn some truth, even though I run a risk of being sometimes deceived.

I reasoned with myself as follows: If a man do not exert himself in an enterprise, he will fail, but, if he exert himself, he has a chance for success.—But why should I work when there is always a strong chance for failure? If you do not exert yourself, there is a certainty of failure, but if you go earnestly to work, there is a chance for success. If you are determined never to believe anything, you will certainly never know the truth, and none but fools will say they will not believe anything whatever for fear of being deceived sometimes. [44]

So I determined to weigh everything dispassionately in the scales of deliberate judgment, and to accept the conclusion, whatever it might be.

But often finding it difficult to obtain firm faith in my conclusions, I determined to act on such conclusions as I had verified, as though I did believe them, whether I really believed them or not. And by thus acting on them for a short time, I came to have full confidence in them. I had disbelieved the Christian miracles on the strength of the maxim, that it is always more probable that a human witness should be deceived, or even lie, than that the order of the universe should be changed. For we often see men deceived, and have often known them to lie, but have never known the order of nature to be violated. I said, however, God created the order of nature, and therefore may have

violated it at some time, for he that made, can unmake, or alter—who knows? If, therefore, good and sufficient testimony to any miracle can be adduced, we must believe in the miracle. For, evidently, God may have done such a thing, and, if he has done it in past times, we could know of it only through the testimony of witnesses: if we say, therefore, we will not believe such testimony, we do it under pain of a heavy penalty; for we foreclose ourselves from [45] the knowledge of truth in that case—as, evidently, such truth can be learned only through testimony. Still I did not believe in the Christian miracles, for the testimony was altogether unsatisfactory.

Looking over my papers, I find, on the back of an old money account, a sort of journal referring to the events of this sub-epoch; and I subjoin such passages from it as promise to prove interesting in the connection. The extracts, poor as they are, are worth more than the money accounted for on the other side of the sheet.

March 1839. I see that by physical indisposition, the mind may be stricken, the most intense intellectual energy prostrated, the strongest moral courage undermined and reduced, and all the philosophy of the Stoics rendered of no effect. To what purpose do we train ourselves to endure with patience every privation, to suffer in silence every species of injustice, and to bear up against adversity with resignation? How long will we flatter ourselves that—though the body may be subdued—the mind is unconquerable ?

April 1839. There are, it may be, a million of different religions, and sects of religions in the [46] world. Most of them have their priests appointed to sacred offices: many of them have their sacred books, treating of diverse points of faith. These sects maintain a reciprocal persecution, and the world is one vast stage, on which the tragedies of imprisonment, torture, and judicial murder for the sake of religion, are continually enacted. If the suffering of martyrdom, and every species of persecution, with resignation and patience, be any proof of the Divine Authority of any particular belief, then the truth of the dogmas held by each and every one of these sects, is abundantly demonstrated.

April 1839. But how do I know that the Christian preachers actually believe the doctrines they teach? I have no doubt they really suppose the preaching of their doctrine to be conducive to the welfare of the world: but, if I ask them concerning their doctrine, it will be impossible for them to give me a satisfactory answer; for, if they believe in Christianity, they will tell me they do, and tell the truth; but if they do not believe, they will still tell me they do, because they think the upholding of the doctrine to be necessary in the present condition of society. How shall I find out whether the christian preachers are honest men or the contrary? Verily I cannot say. [47]

May 1839. As no two men ever agree on the subject of religion, and I am at this time in great doubt on that matter, I have determined never to mention the subject again. I have never seen any good derived from such discussions, but, on the contrary, have often seen them attended with much evil.

May 1839. "One fact is worth a host of speculations."

"We are to seek for truth in nature, and not in the operation of our own minds."

May 1839. I have until now been anxious for the good word of the world. To-day this is to be clanged, and henceforth I shall be satisfied with my own approbation.

June 1839. Many men have I seen injured by too much talking. I have heard of men injuring themselves by too much silence: such a thing may very possibly have occurred, but no case of that nature ever came under my particular observation.

June 1839. I denied all belief in the Christian Revelation, but, finding myself tending toward a state of immorality and utter heartlessness, [48] I was forced to take to the New Testament in self-defence.

June 1839. I think the doctrine that Logic is an invention of the devil, has more truth in it than is generally supposed.

The rest of the Journal consists of verses.

It appears to me that I had reproduced, in this first sub-epoch of the grand epoch of reasoning, the doctrine indicated in the book of Job, a doctrine which formed the foundation of the early Patriarchal civilization.

In the book of Job, the three comforters—and at last Job himself—endeavored to justify God, by showing that the wicked, though they triumph for a while, yet meet in the end with just retribution. But the tenor of the book shows the absurdity of all such reasoning; for Job, a just man, is represented as being persecuted merely for the purpose of enabling an angelic personage to gratify his private curiosity. "And Satan (not the Devil, but an official adversary,) answered the Lord, and said, Skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath, he will give for his life. But put forth thy hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face." [49]

In the beginning of the poetical discussion, Job's friends put God on trial, and deliberately pronounce that he is justified in his ways, that Job deserves the punishment indicted upon him, and that, therefore, the Divine Conduct is strictly conformed to the immutable rule of righteousness. But Job answers very sensibly:—

"Will ye speak wickedly for God?
And talk deceitfully for him?
Will ye accept his person?
Will ye contend for God?
Is it good that he should search you out?
Or as one man mocketh another, do ye so mock him?
He will surely reprove you,
If ye do secretly accept persons.
Shall not his excellency make you afraid?
And his dread fall upon you?"

This is perhaps the most perfect rebuke that was ever directed against those incompetent and stupid persons, who presume, because of the supposed excellency of their own hearts, to come forth and justify on all occasions, the divine conduct, as *they* understand it. It is as mean and despicable to accept God's person, when the course of his Providence appears evidently to run counter to justice, as it is to accept the person of any very respectable neighbor. "His excellency would make us afraid, and his dread would fall upon us, " forcing us to judge justly, even if the [50] Almighty himself were on trial, and we were to be damned for giving a just verdict against him, if it were not for our being secretly moved by an abject fear of his person.

What did Job's friends, or even Job himself, know of the real cause of his sufferings? The preface to the poem tells us there was a dispute in heaven as to whether Job would continue to maintain his integrity if God should take from him all outward prosperity, and bring him, through distressing disease, to the brink of the grave. The difficulty was to be settled by way of experiment; not that the Lord was ignorant of what the result would be, but that the Adversary required ocular demonstration. When the suffering came upon Job, how far from the purpose were the speeches of all his friends !

The justification of the present order of things, by saying that the suffering we undergo is ordained by Providence, is not only stupid, but wicked. God never willed that the world should be the den of misery it is; and most of the suffering in it comes from the perversity of the very class of persons who justify evident immorality, because in their stupidity they suppose it to have been committed by God. These Job's comforters, [51] who, with elongated faces, and nasal and righteous accent, justify all evil by attributing it to the Almighty, are the true curse of the world. They not only degrade human nature in their own persons, but also misrepresent the Divine Justice in such a way as to drive every honest man who believes their statements, into direct opposition and open war with the absolute Author of the Universe.

But if it be wicked to justify the order of Providence, when it appears in our eyes to be totally opposed to the principles of rectitude, it is unspeakably absurd for us to attempt to *condemn* it [un]der any circumstances whatever. And the main moral of the book of Job appears to be even this, viz: That men are by no means called upon either to justify or condemn the ways of Providence, and that the Absolute is abundantly competent to conduct his own affairs, without rendering any account of them to men.

How can we justify or condemn God's ways except by putting him on trial, and comparing his actions with the moral law? And how can we try God by the moral law without implying that he owes fealty to that law, thus subordinating the Creator to the creature—for God, by creating nature, including the nature of man who is a moral [52] agent, created the moral law, and therefore has power to change it according to his good pleasure. It is well for us to be cautious when we attempt to justify Providence—

"Remembering that God is in heaven,
And we upon earth,
That our words may be few."

It is our business, not to justify Providence or to condemn it, but simply to let it alone; for we can make no affirmation concerning the Absolute, which is not absurd; for, by our nature, we are incapable of any knowledge beyond that of relative existences. We know concerning the Absolute, precisely nothing at all, save the bare fact of his powerful existence; and when we affirm anything concerning the law of his action, we speak relatively, and, consequently, affirm that which must of necessity be false. If the Chaldean be wrong in contending against an imaginary relative God, who does not exist, the Pietists, and Job's comforters, are equally wrong in handing in their adhesion to the same non-existing God: and the Chaldean has, indeed, an immeasurable advantage over the Pietist; for the Chaldean preserves the dignity of man, and the purity of the moral law, while the Pietist sacrifices the moral law at the shrine of an imaginary relative governor [53] of the universe, whose actions, because he attempts to exercise also the functions of an Absolute God, are of necessity *unjust*.

"As the heavens are higher than the earth,
So are God's ways above our ways,
And his thought above our thoughts. "

Job begins by assuming; the Chaldean ground, to a certain extent at least, saying, that if God's ways contradict the rule of right, no man ought to accept his person and justify his ways on that account. He afterwards suffers himself to be seduced to the Pietistic ground; for he afterwards affirms that, though God's justice is not manifest at present—ultimately all things will come out in a way to enable us to see that God had subjected his action throughout to the rule of right. Job's friends never once abandon the pietistic position.

The Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, saying,

"Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him?
He that reproveth God, let him answer it!"

To which Job replied,

"Behold I am vile; what shall I answer thee?
I will lay mine hand upon my mouth.
Once have I spoken; but I will not answer:
Yea twice; but I will proceed no further." [54]

After Job had seen the mighty power of God, he answered again,

I have uttered that I understood not!
Things too wonderful for me, which I knew not!
Hear, I beseech thee, and I will speak:
I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me.
I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear:

But now mine eye seeth thee.
WHEREFORE I ABHOR MYSELF,
AND REPENT IN DUST AND ASHES."

And how does the author of the poem defend the Order of Providence? does he show that all turns out ultimately according to the moral law made for men? Not at all.—When the Lord speaks from the whirlwind (itself a symbol of power) he does not justify himself by showing his ways to be just, as man understands justice. There is not one word of human morality in the whole speech attributed to the Absolute. Nay, the whole discourse which proceeded out of the whirlwind, turns on these two points, (1) Man is weak, and without understanding; (2) God is absolute, creating all things according to the good pleasure of his will.—And the conclusion of the whole, is, evidently, that the moral law was made for man, and that he that is wise will walk in accordance with it: also, that he who is wise, when he thinks of the Absolute God, will say—

"Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty, instruct him?"

I had, as it appears to me, reproduced the open pantheism of the early Patriarchal civilization: but my case was very different from that of Job and his contemporaries, for they had a religion, since God spake to them by inspired prophets.—

"Men whose eyes were open spake unto them:
They spake, which heard the words of God,
And knew the knowledge given by the Most High,
Which saw the vision of the Almighty,
Falling into a trance, but having their eyes open."

But as for me, I lived in the world without a revelation, and my path before me wound through

"A land of darkness and the shadow of death;
A land of darkness, as darkness itself;
And as the shadow of death, without any order,
Where the light was as darkness."

Regu.

SECOND SUB EPOCH:—*that of reasoning in reasoning.*

One day I sat down almost overcome with the burden of a problem that had haunted me for more than a week. The question was this:—Are the facts of memory an actual vision of the real objects which exist in nature, or are they pictures [56] and representations, mere copies of those objects, copies having no place out of the mind itself? I reasoned as follows: I can conceive of the solar system, with the sun in the center, the planets revolving around the sun, and the moons around their planets,—now

the question arises, is this internal conception identical with the objective solar system itself, or is the whole a mere picture or representation, a mere mental copy of that system? The affirmation that the conception is identical with the outward object, is by no means unplausible; for whenever I observe the solar system itself, a certain notion of it (a notion undoubtedly identical with the conception in question) always arises to my mind. Moreover, when I occupy my thoughts with the notion thus acquired, a most curious phenomenon invariably presents itself; for I am able to carry out and perfect this vague notion, correcting even some inaccuracies of practical observation; nay, more, when I turn in upon myself and reflect and compute, I find to my astonishment that I possess more than I have received; for I find myself able to learn new things by contemplation of the internal conception, things which I certainly never observed, and which I can verify by a more extended observation of the motion of the actual and material stars. Now how am I able to [57] obtain results, by private meditation, which correspond exactly to outward facts, if the object perceived in meditation be not identical with the object perceived through the medium of the outward senses?—I see therefore, in internal meditation, not a mere representation, but the real natural object itself: only I see it through a different instrument, and in a different manner. In one case I see the solar system with the eye of the body, in the other I perceive it directly by the internal, mental eye.

But I was not altogether satisfied with this conclusion. Indeed I have never been able to see clearly the value and bearing of this speculation; but I write it down that the history may be complete. If I held strongly to the order in which the narration is written, I should perhaps leave this circumstance out altogether: but, without doubt, it has its value and place, although I am not able at this time to assign it its true position.⁷

As I remarked some pages back, I had determined to investigate questions carefully, weighing the evidence relating to them, and then to act as I thought a cool and rational man ought to act under the circumstances. I thought of the vow I had vowed in imitation of Jacob, and, weighing all the circumstances connected with, and following it, I concluded that the evidence seemed fairly to indicate a direct interposition of Providence in my favor. If I had any doubts, they were outweighed by my determination to act according to conclusions founded on sufficient evidence, whether my mind were satisfied or not. I had promised, if the Lord brought the business on which I was engaged to a prosperous conclusion, to devote ten per cent. of my permanent income to religious purposes. Now, although my business had been eminently successful, so that my income was oftentimes nearly double what I had anticipated, I had not as yet put apart a single dollar for the Divine Service. Evidently, if I were to abide by my logical conclusions, I must pay up: moreover, a sense of honor, and respect for my word, required me to settle the account immediately. The Lord had fulfilled his part of this contract of my proposing, and it seemed to me that I should be dishonored, if I failed to keep my word. Sentiments of justice, and reverence [59] to God, combined with a feeling that further hesitation

⁷ The reader will unquestionably perceive, nevertheless, that the foregoing remarks are but an amplification or paraphrase, of a passage on one of the opening pages of the "Reform of the Understanding," by Spinoza, and that they are introduced to serve as a sort of bridge of transition between the Patriarchal order of thought, and that which prevailed in ancient Greece.

under the circumstances, would be conduct unbecoming a gentleman, led me to think it best to commence a new course of action by paying my just debts.

Immediately I enclosed a fifty dollar treasury note in a letter, and sent it to a distinguished clergyman. The letter ran as follows:

SIR:

Herewith enclosed, I transmit a Fifty Dollar Treasury Note. You will confer a favor by distributing the money among the poor, making no distinction whatever between the religious and the irreligious poor. This letter is sent by one who has a great respect for—but no belief in—the Christian Religion.

I hesitated however, for a moment, about sending this money to the Reverend Gentleman;—for I had so little faith in ministers that I feared he might put it into his own waistcoat pocket, and let the poor go. But I reflected that I had no way of disposing of the money in the Lord's service, and that, if the clergyman took it for himself, my skirts were cleared, and he only was responsible. So, after satisfying myself that the hand-writing [60] was such as would enable no one to discover the writer, I sent the letter off. Here was ten per cent. of five hundred dollars accounted for. A few days after, I sent twenty dollars in a blank letter to an Orthodox Tract Society in New York city:—if I had seen as many of their tracts then as I have since, I should have disposed of this money in some other way. Here were two hundred dollars more accounted for. After doing this, I returned to my solitary reflections.

At this time, my attention was attracted to the Laws of the Mathematical Curves. The common equation $x^2 + y^2 = R^2$, represents, evidently, the Circle itself; for, by it, we can find any point of a circle whose Radius is given. But this equation merely furnishes an instrument by which we can, at any moment, mark out the points of the circle, and thus draw it: it does not enlighten us in any way in respect to the LAW, the NATURE, of the curve. But if, by differentiating the equation, we obtain another equation, [$x \, d x + y \, d y = 0$], altogether independent of the value of the radius, this differential equation will be an expression, not of any particular circle, but of the general nature of all circles. The ordinary equation gives us the relation of all the points of the circle to the co-ordinate axes, but [61] the differential equation gives us the relation of the points of the circle to each other, and thus becomes an expression of the *circularity* of all circles. The differential equation is, therefore, the IDEA of the Platonists, stated in Mathematical expressions.—But this may not be plain to the reader: I will illustrate this matter, therefore, in another way, and afterwards proceed with the remarks which I proposed to make in this connection:—

Would it not astonish us if we were to see a rose bush springing up from a lily seed? From the lily seed springs forth always the lily plant, and, from other seed, other plants, according to their KIND. We may predict, with perfect certainty, the nature of the plant that will spring from a particular seed. "And God said, let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit, *after his kind*, whose seed is in itself

upon the earth; and it was so." When the lily seed is placed in proper soil, and begins to feel the influences of light, air, moisture, &c., influences concurring with the force within itself, it swells and bursts, because of the process of growth which commences First the root is put forth, afterward the stalk arises with its bark, pores, and other external and [62] internal arrangements, then the leaves show themselves, and, at last, the flower appears in the perfection of its beauty. But the root, bark, leaves, flower, seeds, are always the root, bark, leaves, flower, seeds, of the lily, and never of the rose or violet. This permanency of result, indicates the operation of some permanent cause; for wherever there is a change, there is of necessity some cause for that change; and wherever a series of changes bears a marked and permanent character, we are driven to seek for some permanent cause adequate to the production of that series of changes. What is this secret cause which makes the lily seed give birth always to the lily plant, and never to the rose or violet?—To avoid unnecessary waste of words, let us agree to call this secret cause, *the IDEA of the lily*.

If we take a twig from a peach tree, and graft it into a plum tree, the sap of the plum tree will flow into the engrafted twig: the air, earth, water, that feed the tree, will feed the twig; and the circumstances of the peach twig will be in all respects similar to those of the plum twigs which surround it. It would seem, therefore, that this peach twig should begin to bear plums: nevertheless, it continues to bear peaches as it did while it lived in its parent tree. The bark, fibres, leaves, which [63] grow on the twig, are always the bark, fibres, leaves, of the peach tree, and never of the plum. The twig always remains faithful to *the law of its kind*; it is always true to its *Idea*.

If it should be asked, is not this same *Idea* a pattern in the Divine Mind, according to which all the individuals of a *kind* are moulded? I should answer as follows: *If* the ideas are patterns according to which actual existences are moulded, then, of necessity, actual existences are *like*, they *resemble*, these patterns. But it is impossible that actual things should resemble their ideas: for example, if the lily be *like* its idea, then that idea must be what we are accustomed to call an ideal lily (using the expression as the artists use it) *resembling* an actual lily: but, if these two resemble each other, there must be some power which makes them to have a similarity; there is therefore some power ruling both the actual and the ideal lily, making them to be like each other. The *Idea* of the lily regulates, therefore, the ideal lily as well as the actual one, and is, therefore, different from them both. *The IDEA, therefore, is not a pattern, and things do not resemble their IDEAS*. In fact, if the *Idea* be a pattern, and things resemble their *Ideas*, whenever we think of things and their *Ideas*, a new *Idea* will [4] rise up before the mind, which will be the *Idea* of them all, forming and moulding them all. If we consider this new *Idea* as a pattern, resembling the former *Idea* and the things moulded according to it, another *Idea* will rise up before the mind, and so on to infinity—which is evidence of the absurdity of the hypothesis; for an infinite series of this nature, always indicates the neglect in our reasoning of some element of a causative character.

But in this last paragraph, we have done nothing but reproduce, and paraphrase, a passage in the Parmenides of Plato relating to Causative Forms (or IDEAS):⁸ we have, therefore, reproduced, to a certain extent, the Ideal theory of Plato.

But this IDEA, which moulds and governs the plant in all stages of its growth, is what in more modern language, we are accustomed to call the LAW of the plant's growth. Now it is evident to us, when we look round upon the world, that everything moves, grows, and develops itself according to *Law*. The planets move in their orbits according to *Law*. Man grows, moves, and [65] thinks, according to *Law*. All things, even the very grass under our feet, is subjected to *Law*. And the knowledge of these *laws* is what we call WISDOM; these *laws*, therefore, in their perfection and fullness, are the object of WISDOM, or WISDOM ITSELF, objectively considered. We read, in the Proverbs of Solomon:—

"The Lord by WISDOM hath founded the earth;
By understanding hath he established the heavens. "

And again:—

"I WISDOM dwell with prudence,
And find out knowledge of witty inventions
The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way,
Before his works of old.
I was set up from everlasting,
From the beginning, or ever the earth was.
When there were no depths, I was brought forth,
When there were no fountains abounding with water
When he prepared the heavens—I was there:
When he set a compass on the face of the depth,
When he established the clouds above,
When he strengthened the fountains of the deep,
When he gave to the sea his decree,
That the waters should not pass his commandment,
Then was I by him as one brought up with him;
I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him,
Rejoicing in the habitable parts of his earth,
And my delights were with the Sons of Men." [66]

What Solomon calls WISDOM, Plato calls *Logos*, or the WORD; and the Apostle John, writing in Greek, reproduces this passage from Solomon, borrowing the technical language of the Platonic Philosophy, saying, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God By him were all things made, and without him was not anything made that was made."⁹ What indeed is the rejoicing of Wisdom, and her delights with the sons of men, if it be not the outflowing of that intellectual "Light which enlightens every man that is born into the world." And what is

⁸ See Note D.

⁹ See Note E.

the Logos, or WORD, if it be not the Mother and Ground of IDEAS, as, indeed, the Platonists affirm that it is.

These thoughts passed through my mind, and I at once supposed myself to have attained to a comprehension of that doctrine of the ETERNAL WORD, or WISDOM of God, which prevailed among all the nations of antiquity.—For the Word was in the beginning *with* God, because God is essentially WISE: and the Word *was* God, because no distinction can be drawn, which shall imply an actual difference, between the Divine Substance, [67] and that Infinite Intelligence which is the ground of the Eternal Wisdom. As in a former sub epoch, I had attained to believe in God, the ETERNAL FATHER; so now I had attained to believe in God, the ETERNAL WORD.—

I continued my meditations:—Universal Nature, if these things be so, must, of necessity, actualize itself in an inferior and instinctive Power—a Power of itself neither creative nor initiative, but a mere resultant of the operation of the original forces. The action of this power is *fatality*: the form in which it manifests itself is *necessity* (the power which binds the effect to the cause); and the Power itself is DESTINY. This is the great Power that rules the world. All things fall under the dominion of Destiny: for everything comes to pass according to fore-ordained Laws. The plant is subjected to Law, man also—yea, the whole Universe develops itself according to the Universal IDEA, according to the Universal LAW marked out for it in eternity. Destiny, indeed, originates nothing: yet it takes possession of all things as soon as they begin to exist. It governs all actions, and all consequences which flow from actions. Every act of life is predetermined in the order of Destiny, by actions which precede it. It is not by our [68] own will that we appear in the world, in the present epoch of civilization, and with the characters we possess. It is not by our own will that we are surrounded by the circumstances which do in fact surround us. As soon as we perform an act, that act escapes us—it came from the order of Destiny, and it falls into the order of Destiny. Every one of our acts possesses a certain vitality, as it were, and immediately gives birth to another act, which perhaps we did not foresee, and this other act gives birth to still another, which we certainly did not foresee, and this last to still another, and so on through all eternity. Nothing is lost which is committed to the ever revolving wheel of Nature. Men who lived in ancient times originated acts, which, under the control of Destiny, reproduced themselves in ever varying forms, are reproducing themselves now, and will reproduce themselves forever. These acts, in their mediate consequences, operate upon us, and form part of the circumstances by which our conduct is fatally determined. Would I possess the thoughts which now occupy my mind, if Moses and Plato had not revolutionized the whole world with their startling, doctrines? Moses and Plato confided their doctrines to the soil of Destiny: they planted the germs in individual minds, and behold, those germs have produced trees which [69] overshadow the whole human race. Verily has the Master said, "For every idle word that ye speak, ye shall give an account thereof at the Day of Judgment." All the acts of my life are determined fatally by operations of Nature which took place before I was born: I also, in like manner, am now concurring with Nature, in fatally moulding the conduct of the generations that shall come after me.

If I plant an acorn in proper soil, the power of Destiny will take possession of that acorn and bring forth from it a mighty oak. For the *Law* operates always. If I crush the acorn with a stone, do I thereby destroy its Destiny? No, I merely change it; for a new Destiny commences immediately for it. The fragments become decomposed according to fixed, fatal, and irresistible Laws; and the elements which were united in the composition of the acorn, separate from each other, entering into new relations, in accordance with the motion of the ever-revolving wheel of nature and this wheel revolves always according to Universal Law.

But God, I continued, does everything according to the Word, according to his Infinite Wisdom; and therefore does everything in the best [70] way possible. Now can there be more than one best way possible? Evidently, every way beside that one is, in comparison, a bad way. God, therefore, cannot, by any possibility, act except in one particular way: he, therefore, is absolutely determined in all his acts: he, therefore, *is not free*; for he can act only in one way, viz.: in the way determined by his own Infinite Wisdom. No place can be found in God for human desires, passions, and infirmities; and, because his acts are invariably in accordance with the highest Wisdom, there is in him an absolutely unbending severity. God cannot exercise any mercy, he cannot forgive any sinner out and out; for, by so doing, he would alter the course of nature which he has established in the world. But, if he alter that course, it is because such an alteration is wise: but, if such alteration be wise, then the original course of nature was not founded in wisdom; for a course of nature founded in wisdom permits of no alteration. God is immutable; for, if he be mutable, he is not infinitely wise, and, therefore, is not God, by the definition. The order of nature is so arranged that transgression always brings suffering—this is God's Law, the expression of the Divine Wisdom, and the operation of God's Word in the world. If, out of mere mercy, God forgive any man, then he violates [71] the actual order of the Universe by an arbitrary act, and for the sake of a mere individual. But this individual has no existence except through virtue of the eternal order; and God destroys this very order if he reverses it by an arbitrary act. Of necessity, therefore, God is just, but implacable, merciless. God is holy and just; but it is impossible that he should be FREE.

It is absurd to address prayer to God; for, if he hear it, it is as though he heard it not; for he is so trammelled by his own perfections that he cannot answer it. We cannot change the immutable God by our feeble prayers: for how can he answer prayer without doing violence to his own justice, and reversing the order of the Universe? Verily the Christians are right when they say that no sinner can be forgiven except through the crucifixion of the Eternal Word: but verily they are extremely absurd also; for how can the Word of God, which is not a personal being, suffer crucifixion, and the pains of man? And how can we affirm that God has reversed his Infinite Wisdom, without charging him with folly, and thus affirming—by definition—that he is not God?

I concluded, therefore, that all fellowship between him and me, was indeed impossible. How [72] can any fellowship exist between him and me, seeing he is altogether devoid of human feeling, knowing no mercy, but only immutability, and unvarying obedience to the decisions of his own Infinite Wisdom? I pictured God in my

imagination, under the form of an immense cloud, part of which was dark with internal thunders, and part lighted up with intense glories.

Serug.

THIRD SUB EPOCH:—*realization in reasoning.*

I began now to occupy myself with the practical bearing of these speculations. What, I inquired, is the rule of life which I ought to obey?—Evidently, neither God nor I are free; there is no freedom h, the universe. God acts inevitably according to his Wisdom, and I act inevitably according to the circumstances in which I am placed, taken in their connection with my passions, and the means of information God has given me. As it belongs to God to act according to his Wisdom, so it belongs to me to act as nearly as I can in accordance with the character God has given me. The nearer I keep to my original [73] character, the truer will be my position, and, consequently, the better off I shall be. But what is the fundamental element of my character? Evidently, the passion for self-preservation and self-protection. How shall I gratify this passion? I can answer this question only by a profound study of the Order of the Universe, and of the Law of God. I will begin, therefore, by giving up all thoughts of freedom: I will not ask to be free, for that is impossible; I ask only to be complete according to my *kind*. What then is the IDEA of man? What, for man, is the *Law of the kind*? By living in accordance with the IDEA, I shall obtain within myself all the happiness that is possible for me.

But, I reflected, I live in the midst of men, in the turmoil of envy, hatred, and jealousy; and, without doubt, I shall not be permitted to live tranquilly in accordance with the IDEA. How then shall I protect myself against the encroachments of my neighbors? I answered that this question, (though it differed theoretically) was the same practically with the one that presented itself to me while I was in the Chaldean sub epoch. Then I was an Atheist, and now I was a Pantheist; but, though my relations to God were changed, my relations to man remained the same. I would, [74] therefore, submit to God, but be a Chaldean to my neighbor.

I would let men understand that it was dangerous to meddle with me. If a man should circumvent me now, and injure me, I would wait my time, but revenge myself with interest as soon as opportunity should offer. Thus men would take warning, learning in a short time to respect my rights and feelings, and to refrain from all trespasses on my premises. Is not the passion for revenge implanted in the very depths of my nature? God will not forgive me when I violate his laws, neither will I forgive any man who trespasses on my rights.

But here a new thought struck me: suppose, I said, a man should injure me, and then come to me, humbling himself before me, confessing his fault, and expressing penitence for what he had done—would I forgive this man, because he had humbled himself before me? No, I answered, never!—My vengeance shall be as swift, unswerving, and unrelenting, as is the motion of the stars of heaven in their courses. Is God moved by

pity? I would exult in the humiliation of my enemy, and then I would annihilate him. This thought took my fancy, and excited my imagination: [75] I endeavored to form a distinct conception of the whole matter, and of the way I would behave under the circumstances. So I pictured to myself, in imagination, the whole scene, the humiliation of my enemy, and my own triumph. I went through the whole history of the ideal transaction; I dwelt on all the details of the injury to my self till my wrath was fully roused; I paused at every incident of my enemy's humiliation, that I might lose no possible sentiment of triumph; and thus I went on, in imagination, till the time came to strike the fatal blow—when, lo! a singular phenomenon astonished me. I had no strength to strike the blow; for no feeling remained in my mind, save an earnest pity for my enemy, which moved me almost to tears. I saw, at once, that my remorseless cruelty was in theory and imagination only, that it was a mere result of my speculations, that it came merely from a superficial perversion of feeling occasioned by false views. I found that I had really been all along a man overflowing with the milk of human kindness. I found that all my bloody theories would long before have vanished into thin air, if I had come so near their practical realization as even to have formed a distinct conception of such a realization. I found that all along, even in my Chaldean bitterness, I should have hastened—yea, rejoiced— [76] to forgive any one who had injured me, upon the first symptom of sorrow on his part. But this intense sentiment of pity, carried me back into my soul, far toward the foundation of my being, till I became conscious of the presence of regions of existence I had never penetrated before.—All at once, I sprang forward with a shout of joy; for, in the very depth of my being, I had discovered that I myself, was an EFFICIENT CAUSE. My whole physical system was affected. My theories seemed to rush violently back into non-existence. The whole universe, as I had conceived it, fell into the abyss; my brain swam, the circulation of my blood was disordered; I seemed to see heaven and earth cracking and separating into fragments around me, and the fragments seemed to be swept away as by a mighty whirlwind, amid the rolling and crashing of universal thunders.

I had, indeed, become really ill. But in the midst of the excitement of my physical system, this great formula seemed to be continually repeating itself;—*Life is the activity of an Efficient Cause*, LIFE IS THE ACTIVITY OF AN EFFICIENT CAUSE.¹⁰ I saw that I had unconsciously built up all my speculations upon the premiss that I myself was *dead*: and now when the evidence to my mind [77] was irresistible that I was ALIVE, an *efficient cause*, that is, A FREE AGENT,¹¹ no one can tell how I loathed the practical conclusions of all my preceding theories.

I expected a great deal from this formula which thus revealed itself to me, in the midst of a tumult of thought; and, verily, I was not disappointed: for, first of all, it utterly annihilated my Pantheism. I reasoned as follows:—

I am revealed to myself, *by observation in consciousness*, as TRANSCENDING TIME: for I perceive the facts of my memory, and say of them, They are facts of memory, and I contradistinguish myself from them in consciousness—therefore they are *not me*. I am not a fact of memory, but a living, perceiving, subject. I see also the relation between

¹⁰ See Note F.

¹¹ See Note G.

these facts of memory, and call it time; but say, it is a relation between things which are *not me*, and, therefore, it also is *not me*. I perceive *it*—*it* is *time*. Time is the relation in which the facts of memory, stand to each other, and not the relation in which they stand to me. The events and their relation, stand before me in the relation of *objects perceived*; but to [78] each other they stand in the relation of *time*. To me, a transaction of ten years date is as present as an affair of yesterday—for if it were not thus present, I should not be able to see its relation to the affair of yesterday, affirming that it took place exactly ten years ago, all but one day. I contradistinguish myself from time, and am independent of it: nevertheless, all my acts fall in time. When I perceive, think, will, the perception, thought, volition, is an act which is an event, following some events, and preceding others; but *I*, who originate these events, remain still transcending time; for only the acts, and not the *I*, find a place in time. The *I*, therefore, IS in ETERNITY, but *exists* in *time*.

If we abstract from the soul, its active existence, there will remain its essential Being, which is rooted in eternity—not an eternity which is time indefinitely extended, but an eternity altogether independent of time, having nothing in common with time, for it altogether transcends it. It is a matter of no importance to me, if some men see fit not to understand all this; for they are unable to understand it, because they are incapable of that observation in consciousness wherein the soul perceives itself as subject—wherein the soul perceives itself, not as thought, feeling, [79] volition, but as the *I* which thinks, feels and wills. I perceive myself in consciousness, not as an activity, but as the *efficient cause* which exerts an activity. I know that I shall not be annihilated when my activity ceases, but that I shall merely hold my activity *in potentia*, ready to deploy it again when the moment comes. This *I*, this *efficient cause*, this essential being of the soul, could not have been created at any former time,¹² neither can it be annihilated at any future time, because it *is* in *eternity*, in an eternal NOW; and, if it is once, that once is eternity: there is no before or after for it.

I perceive myself in consciousness as an efficient cause. By *efficient cause* I mean a cause which operates by virtue of efficiency *inhering in itself*—I mean a cause which is itself the ground, origin, and reason, of its own activity. Without doubt, I have a notion of *efficiency*, which notion I could have obtained from no source whatever other than the observation of the activity of my own soul. In the outward world I perceive only effects—will any man pretend that he ever perceived an *efficient cause* in the external world? He may indeed have perceived the *operation* of [80] such a cause, but he surely never perceived the cause itself. If I perceive the Divine activity, I perceive only the activity, and never the Efficient Cause which is the Divine Substance. Will any one pretend that he has seen God directly?—Does not the very fact of our possessing a *notion* of efficiency, prove the existence of the efficiency which inheres in our own souls? But what is all this reasoning to me? After prolonged meditation, I have attained to be able to carry on investigations in my own consciousness: I am able, on rare occasions, to perceive myself directly, as an efficient cause—as subject: and, by more extended observation, I find that nowhere else can *directly* observe any *efficiency*.

¹² See Note H.

What then becomes of Pantheism, which is the doctrine that God is the only efficient cause? It vanishes at once. For, if God be the *only* efficient cause, then my proposition that *I* am an efficient cause, is false: but the proposition that God is the *only* efficient cause is one in favor of which no positive argument can be adduced, while the proposition that *I* am an efficient cause is proved by direct observation in consciousness. It is evident that *I* am an efficient cause; but it is by no means equally evident that God also is an efficient cause. The question of the Divine [81] Activity is left very much in the dark:—but, concerning *my* efficiency, in other words, my *freedom*, there is no room for any question whatever.

There is, therefore, another Power in the world, one that is superior to Destiny; for this new Power is able, by becoming acquainted with the Laws of Destiny, to outflank and outwit it. This Power is the WILL OF MAN. If I take a wild and bitter fruit, which has hitherto been under the sole power of Destiny, and plant it in good ground, carefully cultivating the tree which springs from it, the fruit which this tree will bear, will be better than the seed that was planted; and the tree may be made to bear still better fruit, by further cultivation. Without this cultivation, *which is an effect of my efficiency*, the fruit would have remained bitter and worthless. When I have one tree thus improved by cultivation, I may, by the process of grafting, change the destinies of thousands of others.—Every act I perform, falls under the dominion of Destiny, and produces a necessary effect on my character: by taking advantage of this operation, I am able to cultivate good habits, and to eradicate the evil habits I have already formed. For every act originated by myself, and confided to Destiny, is like seed cast into good ground, and will bring forth fruit an [82] hundred fold. Through the force of my Will, I am able to suffer down the consequences of past evil actions, and thus to destroy them. Destiny is indeed a Power that operates by Laws independent of my control, but that is no reason why there should be any enmity between me and it; for it is, as it were, a farm that I inherit: if I plant it with thistles, I shall be obliged to labor very hard to fit it again for useful cultivation; but if I plant it with wheat, I shall in due time reap the fruit of my labors. No farmer complains of his farm because it yields abundantly according to the seed which is planted, but on the contrary rejoices: so ought we to rejoice that in the great field of Destiny, we shall reap even as we have sown. I saw, however, if I would gather from my new formula, all the practical conclusions it was capable of furnishing, that it would be necessary for me to investigate carefully the true nature of this new Power, the WILL OF MAN. I continued my inquiries, therefore, as follows:—

The soul is an efficient cause; and (even if we admit that it sometimes ceases its activity for a moment) we must acknowledge that it holds all its actions *in potentia*, we must acknowledge that it tends always toward actual existence in outward relations. Moreover, Life is the Activity of an [83] Efficient Cause:—even a child will acknowledge this; for when he sees a small substance on the branch of a tree, and is in doubt whether it is a piece of bark or a *living* insect, he will watch closely to see whether the object *moves* itself. If the child think the matter may have been moved by the wind, he will hazard no affirmation; but as soon as he is satisfied that it *moves itself*, he says at once, "It is *alive*, for it *moves itself*." I recognize myself, in consciousness, as a Living Being, that is, as an Efficient Cause:—Now what is the internal, or essential nature of this

Cause which I call *I*? If I abstract all *life* from the *I* (the cause I perceive in consciousness)—if I abstract from it all activity, all that comes from its outgoing motion, there will remain the capability or faculty which the soul possesses of acting—of living. Now what is the character of this faculty?—I answer (1) it is a faculty of exerting an *activity*, for the soul is revealed to itself as an efficient cause; I answer (2) it is a faculty of exerting an *intelligent* activity, for, in all its acts, the soul perceives itself as an *active* and *intelligent* agent. I affirm, therefore, that the soul is a Will; for what is a Will if it be not a Power that exerts its own activity in accordance with its own essential intelligence? The soul is, therefore, not only an efficient cause, and consequently a vital principle, [84] it is also an efficient cause which is an intelligence, and is consequently an intelligent and voluntary vital principle. Moreover, because the soul *is* in *eternity*, all its acts which we designate from the stand-point of time, as past, present, or to come, are *potentially* present to it in the eternal *now* where it *is*: although, indeed, these acts cannot be *actually* present to the soul except as they reveal themselves *actually* to it in time, The soul is therefore, potentially (1) An Activity, (2) An Intelligence (3) A Memory.

This formula is by no means new; for, according to Saint Ambrose,—“In like manner as the Son is engendered from the Father, and as from the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Ghost, so the *will* is begotten from the *intelligence*, and *memory* proceeds from the two. The soul is not perfect without this triad; for, if one of these be wanting, the others are rendered imperfect. And as God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, are not three Gods, but a single God in three persons, so the *soul-intelligence*, the *soul-will*, and the *soul-memory*, are not three souls, but one soul in three powers.”—A parallel passage may be found in the writings of Alcuin, preceptor at the court of Charlemagne. [85]

Evidently, however, this formula of the triple nature of the soul is a formula *very useless in itself*; for it is a formula of the soul *in potentia*, that is, of the soul as *dead*—devoid of all activity, all life.—What is the formula of the soul in its activity, the formula not of the dead soul, but of the soul in its life?

Though the soul is an efficient cause, yet, it is not an *absolute*, but a *relative*, efficient cause: though it acts by virtue of efficiency inhering within itself, yet it is dependent upon that which is not itself for an opportunity to operate.—This appeared to me, at first sight, to be a contradiction; but I went on:—After all there is no contradiction in this statement; for I am a living man, an efficient cause, but cannot exercise my power except in *concurrence* with something which is not myself: for example, I cannot *think* without I have something to *think about*, for certainly I cannot think without thinking of something; yet it is *I* that think. I am an active intelligence; nevertheless I cannot exert my intelligent power except upon something capable of becoming an object of thought. In like manner, I cannot remember anything, if there be nothing to be remembered. Though I have my being *in potentia*, as intelligence-memory-will, and have this being [86] within myself, independently of everything which is not myself, yet I have no *life* in myself alone; for, in every act of life, I am in *concurrence* with that which is not myself—I think *something*, I remember *something*: in every act of life I am brought into relations with that which is the object of that act. If, therefore, the relation be destroyed, I cease from all activity,

enter the *potential* state, that is, *die*: for death is not the destruction of the soul's being, but a cessation of its life, and a withdrawal of the soul from *actual* existence.

But what, I inquired, is the means by which I am brought into relations with that which is not myself? In other words, what are the conditions of my *life*?—Evidently (I answered) I am brought into these relations through the medium of my body, of my physical frame. The question, therefore, complicates itself still further; and I must adjourn all hope of obtaining a solution of my difficulties, until after I have obtained some satisfactory knowledge in relation to my physical system.

What then may I know of my bodily nature? what can I understand concerning this instrument which I call my physical system?—¹³ [87]

¹⁴Embryogonists have recognised that the human embryo, in the process of its growth, passes from an amphibious state to that of a polypus, afterward to that of an annelid, then to that of a fish; after this it resembles the form of the reptile, then that of the bird, then that of the mammifer, until, lastly, the organic character which specifies man, manifests itself. But these last acts of growth are perceptible only in the development of the nervous system; for the outward form takes the human appearance as early as the stage in which the nervous system reminds us of that of the reptile. Thus the human organism traverses all living forms, gathering up and preserving in each one of them, so much, among the elements of these forms, as agrees with the definitive existence to which it is destined. Not that man is even truly a polypus, a reptile, or a bird, for, from the beginning the germ contains the promise and prophecy of its ultimate form. We may say, therefore, that the system of man contains, in its degrees of relative development, all that exists in the the animals, plus that which is proper to our species. [88]

The geologists, by examining the strata which form the crust of the earth, have discovered that the different orders of animated existence made their appearance in the world successively, the lowest and simplest appearing first, and the others following in a regular ascending series. This series is the same with the one furnished by the embryonic history of the human being, who reproduces, in his various changes (passing from one form to another, before he sees the light of the sun,) the history of the pre-Adamite animal creation—a history well set forth, in the account of the first five days, or indefinite epochs, of creation, in the Beræshith of Moses.

But as man, in his physical system, seems to sum up the physical systems of the whole animal creation, so, in his passional nature, he seems to sum up the passional natures of all the lower animals. In diseases, the minor centers of nervous activity exert themselves to a certain extent independently of the principal center; and, on these occasions, man seems sometimes to manifest a nature which is animal rather than human. We know that insanity and mania have their origin in disorder of the body. We know that different diseases, affecting different organs of the body, cause the manifestation in the patient of [89] different passions and dispositions. *All the natural appetencies and simple*

¹³ See Note H.

¹⁴ A Complete Treatise of Philosophy, by P. J. B. Buchez. 3 vols. 8 mo. Paris, 1838. Vital Dynamics, by J. H. Green, F. R. S. London, 1840.

propensities may be excited by the action of drugs on the physical system; so that we are authorised to conclude that these appetencies and propensities have their seat, not in the soul, but in the body. The soul, which is pure activity, pure intelligence, and pure memory, does not manifest its activity in its pure state; for it is not in direct relation with that which is not itself, since it acts always through the body. Thus the activity of the soul is coloured, as it were, by the medium through which it passes. As it proceeds from the soul, it is pure activity, but as it appears after undergoing transformation by the physical medium, it is appetency, which is the first form of passion. The soul furnishes the activity, which is indeed the life, but the body, growing and developing itself under Law, in the order of Destiny, limits and defines the activity of life, by furnishing the conditions and occasions, in which it can be manifested. The destiny of the living being is to a great extent determined by the capabilities and adaptations of the body, for the soul can act in the material world only under material conditions, and these conditions are given it in the body in which it lives.

When the *appetencies* are transformed by the [90] action of intelligence upon them, they become *passions*; and then the mere animal instinct is changed, so that it is no longer animal, but human.

Thus it appears that there can be no real life, no human tendency, sympathy and passion, except when the soul is in connection with the body. Thus it appears fully, though we are *potentially* will-intelligence-memory, that we are passion-sympathy-sentiment only so long as we dwell in a body. Thus it appears that when we are separated from the body, we at once re-enter the *potential* state, that is, *die*, that is, again, cease from all *existence*, retaining only our essential *being*.

But these conclusions troubled me. Have I not now, I asked, reversed all that I have hitherto established in this sub epoch of my history? Have I not brought the *Will of Man* once more into total subjection to *Destiny*? If I am free according to my intelligent *being*, am I not enslaved according to my passional *existence*? And am I not governed in all my acts by OUTWARD MOTIVES, which operate upon me according to my passional existence? I received some satisfaction by reflecting that there can be no possibility of any such thing as an *outward motive*. I reflected as follows: [91]

That which operates upon my body, is a mere mechanical influence, a mere transmission of motion; for, if I were dead, if the soul were absent, the operation on the body could have no effect higher than that of a displacement of material particles. A dead man is not susceptible to the power of *motives*. What then is a *motive*? It is the outward influence, perceived by the living soul, and transformed by the living soul, till it is no longer a mere outward influence, a mere transmission of material motion, but something far higher than this, viz: an *inward* motive for the soul's action. That which is outward in the motive, is the mere material motion, but that which is in reality the motive, that which affects the WILL OF MAN, is livingly created from within, by the Living Force which is the Will of Man. The motive, so far forth as it is motive, is created by the Living Soul, and the creator is not subject unto the creature: moreover, the *motive*, is *inward* and not *outward*.

But my satisfaction was not complete; for the body, which evidently falls under the Power of Destiny, appeared to intervene, to too great an extent, in determining the circumstances in which it was possible for my Living Soul to act. The question of the relation of the Will of Man to the Power of Destiny, tormented me again. [92]

Late reading, too much study, and prolonged bodily disease, had by this time so affected me, that a sudden and strong change of thought was sufficient to disturb my whole physical system. One evening, while I was in a reclining posture, meditating upon Free Will and Fate, I fell into a sort of trance: I was neither awake nor asleep, but in a state bordering on ecstasy. At once, all distinct thought vanished from my mind, no object presented itself to my imagination; but the abyss, with all its emptiness spread itself before me. Then came a certain something that was invisible, untangible, altogether vague, without character, undefinable, which seemed to be premonitory of something that was to follow. After this, I felt the essential Being, which is my soul, the *I*, moving itself as it were blindly forward into the Abyss. I became at once conscious of my hidden potential Being, though not of its faculties. Immediately, objects and images started up to my imagination, and the potential force instantly so coalesced with them, that I was conscious of nothing but the contemplation in imagination of the representation of a well known locality.

I had little difficulty in finding the meaning of these phenomena. I saw, at once, that all my trouble had come from my neglect to apply a [93] sufficient stress of logic, when I endeavored to trace out the consequences of the simple and evident fact that I was a *relative*, and not an absolute, efficient cause. It is hard to reconcile Liberty and Necessity in a statement in words, but the reconciliation is very simple in fact. It is impossible, by any arithmetical process, to extract the square root of two exactly; nevertheless, there is a square root of two, and it may be constructed geometrically with perfect exactness; for the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle, having each side of the right angle equal to one, is exactly the square root of two. Every act of life is a perfect practical reconciliation of the powers of free will and destiny. In fact, Life may be defined as that which practically reconciles liberty and necessity. Every act of life is, at once, free and necessitated: free, because it is originated by an efficient cause acting by its own power, necessitated because this cause acts in concurrence with the circumstances falling under the dominion of Destiny. It is necessitated, because no Vital Principle can manifest itself, that is *live*, except in relations to that which it contradistinguishes from itself. We cannot ask whether man be free *or* determined in his actions; for he is at once free *and* determined.¹⁵ The [94] true question is this: How far is man free, and how far is he determined in his actions? Every act of man is on one side free, because that side is originated by the self-acting power of the soul; and on the other determined, because that other side is regulated by conditions originating in the Order of Destiny.

The soul may be compared to a fountain of water: if this fountain be situated in empty space, and well forth into an infinite vacuum, without bottom, without sides, if it be subjected to no law, it will become infinitely attenuated, it will flow, as it were, no where,

¹⁵ See Note J.

and will produce no effect, because there will be nothing on which it can produce an effect; in like manner the soul, considered by itself apart, in its potential state, though perfectly free, will do nothing; because there is no reason why it should do one thing rather than another. A perfect Liberty, that is, a Will that is determined by nothing but itself, will do nothing whatever, but remain always in the potential state—it will remain *dead*; that is, without manifestation and activity, in which life consists. But, if this fountain of water be situated on the surface of the earth, where it can work its way between hard banks, it will be confined, limited, and will roll on, a noble and majestic river, taking its [95] character from the country through which it passes, *and itself conferring a character upon the country wherever it flows*. Alone, and by itself, the soul, though containing immeasurable capabilities, is altogether imperceptible; but, defined and limited by the objects with which it enters into relation, it manifests itself, and becomes as the noble river.

As the soul may overcome Destiny in the outward course of nature, by studying its Laws, by understanding it, and then make a mere servant of it by bringing (through the originative power of our own souls) new principles into its fatal wheel of operation, thus cultivating it, making it bring forth what we please, even as we cultivate a field, gathering fruit from it, according to the seed we sow,—so the soul may overcome Destiny in the nearer sphere of our own bodies, by operating in like manner toward it. The soul may make a servant of Destiny, but cannot separate its actions from the movement of fatality; and it is well for us that this is so, for Destiny is the most useful servant and instrument that is given to man: it is a present worthy of the Universal Power.

If a man live according to his instinctive tendencies, he will be moved by the impulse of nature, [96] and will be, like the animals, under the control of Destiny. If he live according to his ruling passions, he will have escaped, to a certain extent, from the power of Destiny; because he will live under powers which are destiny transformed by the action of his own efficient nature. If he live according to Wisdom, according to the results of the action of his intelligence upon the facts gathered from experience, and treasured up in his memory, he will be *free*, and Destiny will be his slave.

Upon further meditation, I found that these were far from being the only conclusions which a fair logic might draw from the principle that our life is the activity of a *relative* efficient cause.—This activity, which is our Life, is *the relation itself* which subsists between us and the object in concurrence with which we live: and this is but another statement of the magnificent formula of Pierre Leroux, that ALL LIFE IS AT ONCE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE.

Moreover, all the relations between relative causes, must be either (1) Self-existing, or (2) originally depending on something which is not themselves. But (1) no one of the relations can be self-existing, for then it would have an [97] existence distinct, and to a certain extent separate, from the causes related, and would continue to subsist even after one or both of these causes should have re-entered the potential state—which is simply absurd. The relations must, therefore, be dependent upon something which is not themselves.

These relations must, then, originally¹⁶ depend either (1) on the causes related, or (2) on some other cause or causes. But (1) No relation can ever originally depend on the causes related; for [98] the simple reason that these causes never could have originally brought themselves into relation, if they had not, even before that original act, been already in relations. For, if causes come into relations by their own act, influencing each other so that they shall henceforth act in concurrence, this act of coming into concurrence is itself an act of concurrence, that is, in relations: so we have the absurd consequence of an original concurrence going before the very first concurrence. The supposition, therefore, shuts itself out from all possibility of existence. The relation, therefore, depends upon some cause or causes other than the causes related.

It depends then, either (1) on some multiplicity of causes other than the causes related, or (2) upon some single cause other than the causes related. But if (1) it depends on a multiplicity of causes, then those causes on which it depends are in certain relations to each other; for they concur in causing this relation to exist. In this case, therefor, we have only passed from one problem to another identical with it; for the relation between the causes which cause the first relation to exist, must itself be caused either (1) by a multiplicity of causes, or (2) by a single cause. If it be caused by a multiplicity of causes, [99] the same problem presents itself again, and so we may go on to infinity, unless we meet with some single cause on which all the relations depend, And we must meet with such a single cause, otherwise we shall have the absurdity of an infinite series originating from, and depending on, nothing at all, while each term of the series, even the very first, is dependent upon, and originated from, something which precedes it. *Therefore the existence of causes in relations, implies necessarily that there is a cause which is not in relations.*

I have reproduced this argument as well as I could, for it passed through my mind so rapidly that I was not conscious of the steps. But all this reasoning is to no purpose. The following proposition and conclusion, if rightly considered, are self-evident:—

If there were no ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE, there could be no RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES: but there are RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES, therefore, the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS.

The necessary corollary followed at once:—

¹⁶ The objection, that perhaps the relation is self-existing *in time*, that perhaps it was never originally produced, that go back as far as we will, it was already in existence—is untenable: this indeed is self-evident, but shall, nevertheless, be demonstrated. That which is self-existing in time, if it exist *once*, must subsist *always*; for, by the fact of its self-existence, it is not self-destructive, but self-existing; nothing exterior to itself can ever destroy it; for, because it is self-existing, it has of necessity all the conditions of its existence within itself, independently of every thing which is not itself. Now a relation which has *changed*, is no longer the same relation, but another: but all the relations which subsist between relative causes, *change* under our eyes at every movement: therefore these relations, though they exist *once*, do not subsist *always*; therefore, these relations are not self-existing *in time*. Q. E. D. The hypothesis of the self-existence of relative causes, cannot account for the existence of the causes themselves; much less can it account for the existence of their relations: for the inter-*dependence* of those causes (something very foreign to self-existence), is a necessary prior condition of the existence of the relation

But every efficient cause is ALIVE, therefore [100] the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS ALIVE. I believe, therefore, in the LIVING GOD.¹⁷

All this was new to me, and I felt I had now received the key to all my difficulties. There was still another power in the world, a power as much superior to the Will of Man, as the Will of Man is superior to Destiny.¹⁸ This new Power is the WILL OF GOD, and its action is PROVIDENCE. Destiny subsists notwithstanding the operation of the Will of Man; in like manner, the Will of Man subsists notwithstanding the operation of the Will of God. God is *alive* and I am alive, there is therefore *possibility* of communion and fellowship between him and me. Because God is alive, he can hear and answer prayer; he, therefore, is free; communion and fellowship with him is, therefore *practicable*. What if he will not answer!—yet I know that the Living God hears me, and if I speak to him in prayer, I have some communion with him of necessity. Besides, he does answer! all the works of nature, his daily PROVIDENCES, are the result of his infinite, free, and rational will, and, therefore, every one of his acts is a word spoken to man. There is communion between God and man; for [101] he speaks to us through his Providences if he will but listen to his words, and we can speak to him through prayer. Because God is ALIVE, he is, in a certain sense *human*, and men, of a very truth, are created *in his image*. And because he is, in a certain sense, *human*, he rejoices in every free-agent, every efficient power acting from itself, that comes into voluntary communion with him.—My feelings as I thus found myself brought into the immediate presence of God, are precisely of that nature, which I do not feel disposed to describe to the reader.

I said, I will commune with God! So I endeavored to pray. I asked, Is it then possible that *I* have faith? I answered, Of course, I have faith, would I be endeavoring to pray if I had not faith? Would I have endeavored to pray yesterday? So I was obliged to place myself in an attitude of prayer, and remain there for some time, before I could become convinced that I had faith. Then I wished I could meet with some Christian: I should have preferred some Methodist ignorant of philosophy, but learned in the religion of christian practice; but my love went forth toward every one who bore the name of Christ. [102]

God is ALIVE, I said to myself; he is FREE, and can forgive men *out and out*; and this is what renders fellowship with him possible. The Order of Providence overrides both the Will of Man and Destiny, yet leaves them both intact. As man may modify the Order of Destiny, and yet has no control over the Power of Destiny, which operates according to its own Laws, altogether independently of Man, so God may modify the operation of the Will of Man and that of Destiny, leaving the Will of Man an independant Power, acting always from itself, by its own energy—for the objects with which man's will concurs, are always in the hand of God. Who can say, therefore, that God, in the order of his Providence, has not sown a divine seed in the midst of the movements of Man's Will and Destiny, which shall ultimately bear fruit to the redemption of both man and nature? Who knows but that he may have sent into the world a Son—an embodiment of his Eternal Word? If he have done a thing of this kind, his act is a movement impressed on the

¹⁷ See Note K.

¹⁸ See Note L.

revolving wheel of Destiny; and that movement must have reproduced itself in ever increasing circles, until the result come at last to act upon me. If he have given such an impulse at any past time, to the operation of Destiny, changing for a moment its fatal action, and thus [103] forever altering the direction of its results, that impulse must be a leaven which has been working, since that time, to the leavening of the whole course of nature. If anything of this kind has really happened, the Divine Act is an event, falling under the conditions of time, and must be verified, like every other event, not by metaphysical speculation, but by the evidences which subsist in relation to it, evidence preserved in the order of Destiny.

So I opened the New Testament again, and read, and was convinced of its truth. My new experience had brought me to the love of God, the love of truth, and the hatred of wickedness. I felt that I had come to a knowledge of the truth by bringing my own Will under subjection to the Divine Will, and by this means only. Through the resignation and abandonment of myself (and, as I was a Power acting from myself, I had something to resign) I came to possess a state of feeling I had never experienced before. I knew also that no man could attain to this state except through the same self-abandonment and resignation to God. When I read the gospel of John, I found that the Apostle possessed the same feelings which I had lately become able to appreciate. John could not have written as he did, unless he [104] wrote out of his own heart; for no man is able to give a clear and perfect description of a sphere of truth which altogether transcends his nature and experience. But no man in this state can, by any possibility, *lie knowingly*. All lies come from the Will of Man; and all pious frauds come from the conviction in the minds of their authors that the order of God's Will is not holy enough. But God's Will was evidently, for John, the perfect rule and measure of holiness: he was therefore morally incapable of a pious fraud. And, intellectually, the construction of the doctrines set forth in his gospel, would have been altogether impossible for one who did not fully believe, and live, in them. John bore testimony to the facts of the Saviour's Life, and I believed John.

Moreover, there is no doubt, historically, of the genuineness of the greater number of Paul's Epistles to the Churches; for it would have been impossible, during Paul's life time, to have palmed them off on the Churches, if they had not been really written by the Apostle. Again, if they had been forgeries, they could not have been palmed off on the Churches after the Apostle's death: for what man would have had the face to go to the Churches with a new composition, and [105] say, "This is a letter of Paul, which you received from him during his life-time, and which every man, woman, and child among you, have been perfectly familiar with from the time of the Apostle to the present day? The indications preserved in the Order of Destiny, (which loses nothing) are so strong, that we are forced to admit that the Apostle Paul lived in the Apostolic age, that he was well known in the Churches, that he wrote letters to the different Churches, and that these letters were received with great reverence by these Churches.

The question now arises, Have the letters of Paul, which we now possess, undergone changes and mutilations? The answer is very simple. The letters are constructed according to so stringent a logical sequence, that any interpolation, in any part of them,

which should contradict the Apostle's statements, would stand out so evidently that we should be able to point it out, and denounce it, at once. If the interpolation were a mere amplification of the Apostle's words, running on in harmony with the even tenor of his logic, it would be indeed more difficult to discover it; but then it would be a matter of little consequence whether we discovered it or not. [106]

Now Paul's logic all revolves around a single fact, and the Apostle himself says, if this fact be not true, that all his preaching is absolutely vain, and that the faith of all believers is equally vain. The fact is this:—*That the Man Christ Jesus actually rose from the dead.* Paul evidently believed this fact; and, in one of his epistles, he states that after Christ was raised from the dead, he was seen first by Peter, afterward by the twelve Apostles, then by more than *five hundred persons* at one time, the greater part of which number were alive at the time he was writing, able to corroborate his statement, or to deny it. Would the Apostle have dared to say to the Churches that there were nearly five hundred persons among them who had seen our Lord after his resurrection, if no such persons existed? We have, therefore, sufficient evidence of the following facts: (1) That the Apostle really wrote epistles to the churches, epistles which have been transmitted to us, (2) That he really lived at the time he is generally supposed to have lived, (3) That he, and more than five hundred others, actually believed they had seen our Lord after his resurrection, and (4) That there is as much proof of the actual resurrection of our Lord, as it is possible that there should be of any historical event of the nature. [107]

Then I came to the practical question of the application of all this to my own individual case. I had no fears whatever of failing to find acceptance with God, if I sincerely desired it. I had known from the beginning, this saying of our Lord, " He that cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out."

But, I asked—Though I live for the rest of my life in communion with God, what if I am finally to be damned for what I have already done? I answered—What is it to me whether I am to be damned or not? The question of my private damnation, is one of altogether minor consequence, when considered in this connection. I know the truth of God, and will maintain it, and live by it, whether I am to be damned or not. Even if I am to be damned, I will teach others the truth of God, that they at least may live. [108]

[113]

APPENDIX.

[A.]

THE SERIES BY SEVENS.²¹

The 1st Fountain Spirit:—This is a dark knitting power, secret and bidden; and is manifested in moral relations, as AVARICE—not avarice in its mere relation to money, but a sort of universal passion, a love of fame, power, pleasure, &c not because of their uses, but because of the secret [116] satisfaction derivable from their possession. It is the harsh ASTRINGENCY, the hidden root tending to impenetrability, and to the locking up of itself in itself. It is blind, without knowledge, caring for nothing but itself, recognizing nothing but itself, exercising neither attraction nor repulsion.

The 2d Fountain Spirit:—This finds its root in the first, which it begins to vanquish, it is represented in moral relations by PRIDE, and tends, in man, to isolation. He who is under its influence, recognizes his fellows, but not in any love; he wishes them neither good nor evil, and cares for them not at all. By the energy of the first Fountain, man falls into the hard astringency, and collects himself in himself, recognizing nothing which is not himself; but, by that of the second, he recognizes other men, though only to assert his independence, and to isolate himself from them. The energy of the second Fountain is sweet, mild and meek, in its action outwardly upon other men, and manifests itself in connection with the first under the form of *melancholy*. For melancholy comes from the hard astringency, partly subdued by pride, recognizing and isolating itself. Thus, because the outward relations are not completed, the meekness and astringency spend their energy [117] upon each other, and the soul becomes a prey to bitter raging torment. If the bond of the astringency were not broken, all would be as if in a dark cold prison; as stones and dead concrete matter; but the proud self-isolating spirit breaks this austere band, and comes into sad and cold relations with that which is without; but in the heart itself, the second Fountain, by its reflex influence or energy, works up the astringency into a consuming raging fierceness. Thus the austere band is broken, both as regards the within and the without, or the subjective and the objective.

The 3d Fountain Spirit:—The consuming fierceness and raging torment, are carried to their height in this Fountain, which manifests itself in moral relations in VIOLENT DESIRE and ENVY, sometimes also in VANITY, and AMBITION. This is the bitter or anguish Fountain, and tends to break up the isolation of the two first Fountains. As the second Fountain is the cause of life, so this is the cause of distinct perceptions, and of the thoughts; for it brings man more into relations with that which is not himself. If the third

²¹ The Seven moments or stages, in which the soul passes from the darkness of its own quality into the light of the second Principle, are correspondencies of the Seven days, or epochs, of the Creation of the Material Universe. According to the Theosophists, the soul, which is a living roof of Fire, is, when considered in itself alone, the abstracted austere element of Fire, remaining secret and hidden in its own quality; in which quality, as in the glowing coal the flame whereof is extinct, the dark life burns. The Theosophists compare the *life* of the soul to a flame, and affirm that when it is confined and turned in upon itself, it feeds upon itself with a fierce internal fury: this internal self-consumption is called by them, the lofty Wrath-Fire of Eternity.

Fountain be moved too much, it kindles the second and the astringent, until all becomes a stinging, burning poison. The Theosophists say that this is the spirit of the zealous, jealous, unquenchable [118] wrath of God, which is (according to them) is part also the punishment of the damned. They affirm also that the dark spirits are given over to the anguish of their own souls, desperation and the raging of hell being introduced into the creatures, like gall into the body: but this, they continue, is very good for souls under probation, in stirring up life.

The 4th Fountain Spirit:—When the raging torment introduced by the third Fountain becomes intolerable, then man comes still more into relations; for the fire-flash from the anguish, is the fourth Fountain Spirit, which manifests itself in moral relations ANGER. The whole creation is actuated by this fourth Fountain, which is the great propelling force which keeps it in continual operation.

Man, at this period of his life's development, finds himself to be fallen among thieves; and the thieves are these four Fountain Spirits, which constitute, and are, the foundation of his existence. Astringency; binding avarice; uncontrollable pride; anguish or envy; fierce, furious anger; hold the soul so that it hates light, and every pure spirit that brings light—so that it loves evil, delighting in those who practice it. It is murderous, and [119] isolates itself from the light, refusing to believe that it is light.

Let the philanthropists listen to this:—Who ever would bring the love-light which saves, to a dark spirit shut up in the four first Fountains, must be prepared to meet with a reception which agrees with the dark fire nature. Because of the *pride*, the understanding of the fire-spirit is darkened, so that he despises him who brings light; because of the *astringency*, the fire-spirit will take from its best friend all that he hath; because of the *envy*, it is filled with hatred to him that brings truth; because of the *anger*, it is dangerous and violent. It cannot act without exercising these four Fountains, for these are the fountains and springs of its life. Whoever, in ancient times, endeavored to reform the nations which were sunk in the first four Fountains, or forms of nature, was despised, hated, robbed, crucified, and slain.

It is stated by an eminent Theosophist, that the following properties belong to the Fire Element, by reason of the four Fountain Spirits, viz: fierceness, wrathfulness, sternness, sulphurousness, salnitrousness, which consume, devour, and elevate themselves; so that this fire essence [120] appears evidently to be a dark, harsh, hard, bitter, anguishing, fierce, fiery, wrathful, stern, brimstony, salnitrous, consuming, self-elevating Fire Spirit.

The 5th Fountain Spirit:—This is the outbreaking of the Magia, in concurrence with the exterior love-light element, tending to overcome the intolerable anguish of the preceding Fountains, by transcending them, and entering into a new, a higher, and a spiritual sphere.

The 6th Fountain Spirit:—Into this form of nature, all the reasoning of the series by 7s is thrown. We find in it, therefore, a rapt contemplation, lofty speculations on the

theory of the universe, and a forward and daring movement of genius: this is the form or moment for gigantic cosmogonies.

The 7th Fountain Spirit:—This is the unification of the character, whereby the sensibility, intelligence, and will, are brought to act in harmony—whereby all the Fountain Spirits are made to conduce to one perfect life: whereby the weight and force of the first form, unites itself with the self-centering dignity of the second, and this with the springing vitality of the third, and this last with the fiery energy of the fourth, and [121] so on through the expansive love-fire of the fifth, and the towering intelligence of the sixth, till they all meet and wrestle together in joy, for the exalting of the will of God, in the full harmony of the seventh. [122]

[B.]

The List of generations from Adam, through Cain, to Lamech, is as follows:

1. ADAM.
2. CAIN.
3. ENOCH.
4. IRAD.
5. MEHUJAEL.
6. METHUSAEL.
7. LAMECH.

This list gives us from Adam to Lamech, a perfect series of Seven terms; and we may notice that Lamech, who appears again in another symbolical list among the posterity of Shem, lived exactly 777 years—"and all the days of Lamech were seven hundred seventy and seven years: and he died."

Eve had a third son, whom she called Seth, that is foundation; because in him God had founded for her another seed, to replace that of Abel. The series founded in Seth, gives us a complete logical series of 9 terms:

1. SETH.
2. ENOS.
3. CAINAN. [123]
4. MAHALALEEL.
5. JARED.
6. ENOCH.
7. METHUSELAH.
8. LAMECH.
9. NOAH²²

Noah had three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet. The sons of Japhet form a regular series of 7s:

1. GOMER.
2. MAGOG
3. MAVAI.
4. JAVAN.
5. TUBAL.
6. MESHECH.
7. TIRAS.

²² The reader will find, in Leroux' treatise of Humanity, article *Mythus of Adam*, a full explanation of the interior meaning of the names which occur in the list of generations from Adam to Noah.

The sons of these, grand-sons of Japhet, as given in the connection, make another series by 7s.

The sons of Ham, were Cush, Misraim, Phut, and Canaan: the list of Ham's descendants through Cush, form a regular series by 7s: [124]

1. CUSH.
2. SEBA.
3. HAVILAH.
4. SABTAH.
5. RAAMAH.
6. SABTECHAH.
7. NIMROD.

The descendants of Ham, through Misraim, form a regular series by 9s:

1. MISRAIM.
2. LUDIM.
3. ANAMIM.
4. LEHABIM.
5. NAPHTUHIM.
6. PATHRUSIM.
7. CASLUHIM.
8. CAPHTORIM.

To which add—9. PHILISTIM—who is expressly mentioned in the connection, as having come out of Casluhim.—But this is evidently a list of tribes and races; and the coming out of Philistim from Casluhim, is evidently, not a birth, but a procession forth as a colony.

The descendants of Shem, as was made evident in the text, form a regular series by 9s.

If we pass to the New Testament, we shall [125] find two lists of names, differing from each other, although each purports to give the genealogy of our Lord. One of these lists is found in the beginning of the Gospel of Matthew, the other is found in the Gospel of Luke. If we count the names given in the list of Matthew, we find them to amount—including Abraham and Christ—to forty one generations. But the list does not agree with the parallel lists in the Old Testament; for example, Matthew says that Ozias was the son of Joram, while the author of the Chronicles tells us that he was the great-great-grandson of Joram. The insertion of the names from the book of Chronicles, would lengthen Matthew's list by three terms, making it to number forty four generations, instead of forty one.—But we have neither time nor space to notice the inaccuracies of this list. The idea which Matthew intended to convey, is to be found, not in the enumeration of the names, but in the final summing up. In the 17th verse of the first Chapter of his Gospel, he says,

"So all the generations from Abraham to David are 14 generations; and from David unto the carrying away into Babylon are 14 generations; and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are 14 generations." He is determined, as is evident from this summing up, which by no means agrees either with his own list, [126] or with those in the Old Testament, to make three series, of 14 generations each, between Abraham and Christ.—Now what was the object of Matthew in forcing the Old Testament tables, till they could be made to enter within certain definite, and apparently artificial, limits? It was this:—

Matthew wished to state in a symbolical manner, that our Lord came in the last age of the dispensation which commenced with Abraham; and he looked upon the movement of that dispensation as taking place in 7 distinct epochs; he looked upon these epochs as being themselves, each of them, composed of 7 sub epochs—seven ages, therefore, composed each of them of seven minor ages; or 49 sub epochs in all. We have an illustration in the book of the Revelation, of this manner of conceiving history. The prophetic account of the dispensation that was to come, was written, according to the revelator, in a book sealed with 7 seals; when the first seal was broken, the first epoch became realized; when the second seal was broken, the second epoch became realized; and so on to the seventh seal, where the prophet, desiring to be more particular, divided the epoch into 7 sub epochs, writing the history of the opening of the seventh seal in 7 parts, each part following the [127] sounding of one of the 7 trumpets which were given to the angels that stood before God.—Matthew teaches that our Lord opens the seventh age, the completion of the dispensation in Abraham. He says that between Christ and Abraham, there had been three times fourteen generations, that is, six times seven generations, that is, again, that six epochs of 7 terms each, had passed away, in the Abrahamic dispensation, before our Lord came; and that he came to bring in the seventh age, or last age of that dispensation.

If we pass now to the list given by Luke, and count from our Lord, through Joseph, to Abraham, we shall find from Isaac to our Lord, including-both, just 54 generations; dividing 54 by 9, we obtain, 6: there were, therefore, just 6 complete series of 9s between Abraham, and Christ. Adding to these 6 series, the series by 9s from Seth (the son of Adam) to Noah, and that from Shem, through Arphaxad, to Abraham, we have just eight series by 9s. Luke represents, therefore, our Lord to have appeared at the end of the eighth epoch of 9s, in a grand logical series of 9s, commencing at the creation of the world. [128]

These lists are symbolical rather than historical, and are easily reconciled; for both writers had the same end in view, and actually wrote the same thing, viz: that our Lord brought in the final dispensation, and the last age of the world. The discrepancies between the lists come from the fact that Matthew constructed his system by 7s, and included the history of the Abrahamic dispensation only; while Luke constructed his by 9s and included the whole history of the human race:—the discrepancies between the lists and those in the Old Testament, deserve no very serious notice, as they do not affect the symbolical character of the series.

One fact, however, may strike the attention: the list of Luke has three terms too many, all of which occur in the series between Adam and Abraham. Cainaan, who appears between Aphaxad and Salah, is interpolated—he does not appear in the original series in the Old Testament. Seth and Adam, because they indicate mere points of departure, are not counted in the series by 9s. Subtracting Adam, Seth, and Cainaan, there remain exactly 72 generations, or 8 full series by 9s. [129]

[C.]

"This world was involved in darkness, incomprehensible to the intelligence, undiscoverable by the reason, unrevealed, and immersed, as it were, in all parts, in a sound sleep.

"Then the great SELF-EXISTING POWER, himself unseen, but rendering this world visible, with the five elements, and other principles, manifested himself in the fullness of his glory, dispelling the darkness.

"He whom the spirit alone can perceive, whose essence escapes the organs of the senses, who is without visible parts, eternal, the soul of all being whom no one can comprehend, unveiled his own splendor.

"Having resolved to cause the various creatures to emanate from his own substance, at first, *by a thought*, he produced the waters, and placed in them a productive seed *
* *

"The waters have been called *naras*, because they were produced by NARA (the Divine Spirit); and, as these waters were his first place of [130] motion (AYANA,) he has thence been named NARAYANA, or *He that moves upon the Waters*.—*Laws of Menu*.

"The nature of God is such that he cannot fall under the observation of the senses: he can be neither measured, nor divided, and nothing can resemble him. He is neither fire, nor air, nor water, nor wind: but all things are by him. For, being perfect, he has reserved perfection for himself alone; and he has willed to create and ordain the universe."—*Fragment of Hermes Trismegistus*.

"God is the first, indestructible, unbegotten, indivisible, eternal, dissimilar; the dispenser of all good; incorruptible; the best of the good, the wisest of the wise. He is the Father of equity and justice, self-taught, physical, perfect and wise, and the only inventor of the Sacred Philosophy.

" * * The stable God is called by the Gods *Silent*, and is said to consent with mind, and to be known by souls through mind alone.

" * * Containing all things in the one summit of his own thyparxis, he himself subsists wholly beyond."—*Oracles of Zoroaster*.

"God is one, eternal, immutable, incomprehensible; he created and ordained all things by his Wisdom, and he sustains and preserves them by his Providence; he is everywhere, and no place contains him; he is everything, but is neither of the things which are by him and have received their being from him; he hears everything, sees everything, and penetrates the most secret thoughts; he fills the depths of the abyss, and the immensity of Heaven;—knowledge, welfare, virtue, light, life, these are in him alone, and they are him. He is, at once, infinitely good, and infinitely just. He loves men with a peculiar love, and has created them only that he may make them happy; but, since he is holiness and justice themselves, he renders those happy, and those only, who resemble him through justice

and holiness; and he punishes those who have corrupted the holy character which he impressed upon them when he created them in his own image."

—*Detached passages from Plato, brought together by Dacier.* [32]

[D.]

"What is then, Socrates, the manner in which other things partake of IDEAS, since they can receive them neither partially nor in their totality?

By Jupiter! exclaimed Socrates, it appears to me by no means easy to determine this manner.

But what say you to this?

To what?

I imagine you come in this manner to the unity of each idea: when several things appear great to you—perhaps, in contemplating them, a single and same idea seems to you to exist in all these things, and that is what leads you to think of the unity of greatness.

That is true, said Socrates.

But what ! if you consider together, with the same view of your soul, not only greatness in itself, but also all the other things which are great, will you not see a new unity of greatness, which makes, by necessity, all these things to appear great.

So it would seem.

There will appear to you, then, another idea of greatness, besides greatness in itself and the [133] things which partake of it; and, above all these, a new idea which will communicate greatness to them all; so that each idea would cease to be one in your eyes, and would become multiple to infinity.

But, Parmenides, observed Socrates, each of these ideas is perhaps a thought, which can be conceived to exist in no place more easily than in the soul; in this case, at least, each idea would preserve its unity, and would be no longer liable to the objections you have just made.

What then! replied Parmenides, each of these thoughts is one, but is the thought a thought of nothing?

That is impossible.

Is it the thought of something?

Yes.

Of something which is, or of something which is not?

Of something which is.

Of something that is one, which this thought conceives in all things as a real form?

Without doubt.

Well! is not this, which is thought with such a character of unity, an idea, since it is always the same in all things?

That, again, appears to follow necessarily. [134]

But, continued Parmenides, if all other things appear to you to partake of ideas, does it not also appear to be necessary, either, that everything should be formed of thoughts, and that everything should think, or, that everything should be thought, but deprived of the faculty of thinking?

That is nonsense, replied Socrates. But this, Parmenides, if I am not mistaken, is the probable truth: it is that *ideas subsist as models of nature*, and that other things become like them, and are their copies, and that things partake of ideas only by bearing a resemblance to those ideas.

If any object, said Parmenides, resembles an idea, is it possible that the idea should not bear a likeness to that which is formed in its image, so far as it resembles it, or is it possible that the like should be unlike the like?

It is not.

Is there not a vehement necessity that the like with its like should partake of one and the same idea?

Most assuredly.

That by the participation of which things are caused to be like, is it not the idea?

Exactly.

It is therefore impossible that anything should be like its idea, or that an idea should be like any [135] other thing: for, otherwise, besides the idea, there would always appear another idea; and, if this last should resemble anything, there would be still another; and new ideas would forever continue to manifest themselves, if we suppose the idea capable of becoming like the thing which partakes of it.

That is very true.

It is not, therefore, by means of resemblance that other things partake of ideas, and we must seek for some other process of participation.

So it appears.

You see, therefore, O Socrates, the difficulty which besets the way of him who affirms the existence of absolute ideas.

Perfectly." *Plato:—The Parmenides.* [136]

[E.]

"I pass to China. By the side of Confucius, I find Bouddha under the name of Fo, and Lao-Tseu. Now Bouddha is (like Vischnou) an incarnation of the Divine Word; and Lao-Tseu is the doctrine itself, or the metaphysics, of this Word, this creative Logos. The *Tao-te-king*, the book of Lao-Tseu, speaking of the Divine Reason, of the Logos of Plato, of the Word of the Christians—of the Narayana of India, in a word—represents it as saying:—"I was before the manifestation of any corporeal form: I appeared before the Supreme beginning: I operated at the source of the as yet unorganized matter: I was present at the development of the first great mass, and moved in the midst of the empty space." Can you not find here, both the Brahma Word of the Vedas, which moved on the waters before the creation, and the Spirit of God of the Bible, which brooded on the waters before the same creation?

* * * * * What term does St. John make use of to designate this Son of God who is God, this Reason of God which he distinguishes from God, and which makes of the man Jesus, the [137] Christ? He calls it *Logos*: and Plato—what name does he give to the Divine Reason which he also distinguishes in God? He calls it, in like manner, *Logos*, or *Nous* (reason). And Lao-Tseu and his followers, how do they name this Divine Reason which was anterior to the creation, and the cause of the creation? They also call it the Reason of God, *Tao*.

"Shall I recall to your mind the astonishment that was expressed by our learned men when they found the ideas of Pythagoras and Plato, in the *Tao-te-king*? How, they asked, could such a communication have taken place? Whence came these analogies? Did Lao-Tseu borrow his doctrines from the Greek Philosophers, or did the Greek Philosophers borrow theirs from Lao-Tseu? Learned orientalists, the thing is not so astonishing as you think! For it is not Lao-Tseu alone, and Plato, who have known these doctrines; this metaphysics was known to all the nations of remote antiquity.

"But we ought to compare the doctrines of Lao-Tseu with Christianity, rather than with Pythagoras and Plato. For neither Pythagoras, nor Plato, nor their disciples, anthropomorphized the Divine Word as did the disciples of Lao-Tseu, [138] and the disciples of Jesus Christ. The Chinese Legend relating to Lao-Tseu is in part translated for us:—after repeating the axiom of the *Tao-te-king*, that "The Tao, or the Word, was the great ancestor of the subtle and primordial elements, the organizer of the earth and the heavens; who took root in the supreme repose and the supreme void, before the great origin (the creation); who dispersed the elements in space, and dissipated the darkness," the Sacred Legend adds: "He has transformed his person by taking upon himself a mortal body; he has partaken of all the destinies of this world of mud and dust. He appeared in the world as a great sage; he observed the righteous and the wicked through succeeding generations, and established his doctrines according to the times. He has been, in the order of the times, the great teacher of the generations. He appeared among men, but did

not resemble the crowd of men among whom he was counted." *Pierre Leroux*.—
Christianity.

[F.]

"No one will fear to affirm that the power of self-motion forms the essence and the attribute of the soul: for that which receives motion from an exterior cause, is not ALIVE; while that which internally gives motion to itself, is ALIVE." *Plato.—The Phædrus.*

The Athenian. Since we have attained to this point, answer to this?

Clinias. To what?

The Athenian. When the first kind of movement is found in any substance whatever, earthy, watery, fiery, simple, or composite, how shall we say that this substance is affected?

Clinias. Do you not ask if we should say of this substance, that it is ALIVE, when it thus *moves itself*?

The Athenian. Yes, if it is ALIVE?

Clinias. Without doubt.

The Athenian. But what! when we see living [140] substances, must we not recognize that the vital principle in them is soul itself?²³

Clinias. It can be no other thing." *Plato.—Xth. book of the Laws.* [141]

²³ Evidently not individual soul, however, but what Waldo Emerson calls the *Over-Soul*; for, otherwise, the arguments for immortality, from which these passages are extracted, would be simply and plainly absurd.

[G.]

"Moses said to Adam, as they were disputing before God, Thou art Adam, whom God created and animated with the breath of life, and caused to be worshiped by the angels, and placed in Paradise, from whence mankind have been expelled for thy fault. Whereto Adam answered, Thou art Moses, whom God chose for his Apostle, and intrusted with his word, by giving thee the tables of the law, and whom he vouchsafed to admit to discourse with himself. How many years dost thou find the law was written before I was created? Says Moses, Forty. And dost thou not find, replied Adam, these words therein— And Adam rebelled against his Lord, and transgressed? Which Moses confessing, Dost thou therefore blame me, continued he; for doing that which God wrote of me that I should do, forty years before I was created; nay, for what was decreed concerning me forty thousand years before the creation of heaven and earth?"

We meet the difficulty stated in the foregoing Mahometan parable, by denying first of all, and [142] in the front, the whole doctrine of the DIVINE FORE-KNOWLEDGE.

Where is the Theologian who will hesitate to affirm that God dwells in a timeless present, an ETERNAL NOW? Time had its birth among the changes and mutations of nature, and there only can it have a present existence: but, because God created nature, he transcends all nature; and, because he transcends all nature, he transcends all TIME. God lives in eternity—not an eternity which is time stretched out till it becomes immeasurable, and which still admits of the relations of *before* and *after*, but an eternity which altogether transcends time. With God there is neither *fore-knowledge* nor *after-knowledge*. If it be unlawful to attribute memory and imagination to God, if it be unlawful to say that he *recollects* past events, reproducing them to his mind, is it not equally unlawful to attribute to him the faculty of *fore-knowledge*? Can he possess fore-knowledge without possessing memory, seeing that these are correlatives of each other, and that the possession of either of them, would subject him to all the conditions of time? God created time when he created the worlds, and if there were no worlds, there would be no time: will any one say that God cannot exist without the worlds? [143]

God, indeed, KNOWS all events, even those which, *to us*, are yet veiled in the future, but this knowledge is *present* knowledge, and neither *fore-knowledge*, nor *after-knowledge*.

The fact of God's perfect knowledge of all our actions, if it militate at all against our freedom, must do it in one or the other of the two ways which follow:—either (1) God computes the order of Destiny, and sees in operation a chain of causes and effects which will render every act of our lives necessarily what it will be, and not otherwise; and, seeing this chain, he knows precisely what the future course of our lives will be: in which case, our actions are supposed to be determined, not in any way by his knowledge, but by the force of Destiny; or (2) God knows our actions because he himself determines them,

because he makes them to be as they are, because, in fine, his *knowledge* is a mere consequence of his creative power. Let us examine these hypotheses separately.

(1) The first hypothesis begs the whole question; for God, when he computes the order of Destiny, may very well take into the calculation those modifications of that order which result from the intervention of the Will of Man. If it [144] be granted that the determination of our actions is effected by powers independent of the Will of God, whose operation God contemplates, where is the necessity for denying that the Will of Man is one of those powers? Is there any reason to deny that God can contemplate the operation of Man's Will, as well as the operation of other powers? Moreover, we learn, from observation in consciousness, that the Will of Man does actually operate. The mere fact of God's *knowing* all our actions, no more interferes with our liberty in performing those actions, than would the fact of any individual man's possessing the same knowledge.

(2) The second hypothesis is a mere reproduction, in a different form, of the theory that God creates all things out of nothing, and that there is no operation in the world which is not the mediate or immediate operation of the Divine *Will*. What evidence have we that God created all things out of nothing?—

Verily, none at all! No one can pretend that the theory of the creation out of nothing, has a foundation in Scripture. It is indeed written that "God *created* the heavens and the earth," but where is it written that he created them *out of nothing*? "The Hebrew uses the word BARA, [145] *to form, to bring into order*, to signify *creation*, having no word which accurately expresses *creation out of nothing*."—*Robinson's Calmet*. It is somewhat singular that Moses should be made, by the Theologians, to teach a doctrine which he could not have taught even if he had desired so to do. How could Moses have taught that the worlds were created out of nothing, when there was no expression in the language he used capable of conveying such an idea? Why did not the Hebrews, if, as the Theologians say, they believed in a creation out of nothing invent some word, or at least some circumlocution, to express so important a conception? But is there any evidence whatever that the notion of a creation out of nothing ever entered the head of Moses, or the head of any other ancient Hebrew? If they had any such notion they preserved a very mysterious silence in relation to it, and it is certainly very useless to speculate concerning the private opinions of Moses—those of which he did not see fit to give any indication whatever in his books.—

But the author of the epistle to the Hebrews says; "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of those [146] which do appear."—This passage, so far from stating that the worlds were made out of nothing, says that the things which are seen were made of those which are unseen, the visible from the invisible. Let us compare this passage with a parallel passage from one of the sacred books of India:—"They who are acquainted with day and night, know that a day of Brahma is a thousand revolutions of the Yoogs, and that his night extendeth for a thousand more. On the coming forth of that day, all things proceed from *invisibility* to *visibility*; so, on the approach of night, they are all dissolved away into that which is called *invisible*. The universe, even, having existed, is again dissolved; and now

again, on the approach of day, it is reproduced. That which, on the dissolution of all things else, is not destroyed, is superior, and of another nature from that *visibility*; it is *invisible* and eternal."²⁴

Will it be said that the writer had no relations with India, and therefore could not have borrowed the technical language of its religious philosophy. Unfortunately, the Platonists, with whose doctrines the writer was unquestionably acquainted, used the terms, the *visible* and the *invisible*, the *seen* and the *unseen*, in precisely the way they were used in India.

²⁴ Let us lay down two classes of being, *the seen* and *the unseen*: the unseen, eternal in their relations; the seen, never the same, but ever changing." PLATO.—*The Phædon*.

The Apostle PAUL says, in his epistle to the Corinthians, "We aim not at the things which are *seen*, but at the things which are *unseen*; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are unseen are eternal.

APPENDIX

[H.]

The affirmation that GOD CREATED THE WORLDS OUT OF NOTHING, annihilates itself:

For, if God created them out of nothing, their creation was evidently *possible* to him. This possibility existed as a necessary condition of the creation, *before the worlds were created*; for, had the creation not been possible, it is evident that it would never have taken place. The possibility existed, therefore, in the logical order (for we have nothing to do here with chronology) prior to the creation.—This possibility was not created, but existed prior to the very first act of creation; for, if it was created, its creation was possible, and this new possibility preceded the creation of the created possibility, else that creation could not have taken place. This possibility of a possibility, if it was created, must have been preceded by still another possibility, and thus, by continuing the hypothesis, we fall upon an infinite series—an evident sign of the absurdity of the supposition. [149]

Therefore the creation of the worlds was preceded by the POSSIBILITY of that creation, and this possibility was itself uncreated.

The very first act of the Divine Will must have been preceded by the possibility of that act, else it could not have taken place. This possibility is independent of the Divine Will for it is anterior to the very first act of that Will, and is, indeed that upon which the operation of the Divine Will depends.

It is evident, therefore, that two Powers concurred in the creation of the Worlds, (1) The Divine Will and (2) That which made the creation of the Worlds, and the operation of the Divine Will, *possible*.

God therefore, is not only the voluntary cause of the existence of the universe, he is also the eminent cause; and he knows the things which are made, partly by perceiving them in the operations of his Will and partly by perceiving them in Himself as eminent cause.

The soul of man has its root of being, not in the Divine Will, but in God as eminent cause; for the Soul, as is made evident in the text, transcends [150] all time so far as its essence is concerned, and therefore never began to be, and never can cease to be—that is, it is uncreated. The *possibility* of the Soul's existence, is indeed that root of substance, hid in God as eminent cause, which is the essential being of the soul.

The Divine Will depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very Being of God, and the Will of Man depends also, for *its* ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the same Being or God: the Will of Man, therefore, having its ground and root in the soul's substance, is dependent upon the Being but not upon the

Will of God. God sees all our actions in himself; he sees our subjective movements in himself as eminent cause, and he sees the operation of the circumstances which act upon us in his Will: and thus he sees us as free agents, beings capable of acting in opposition to his will—beings whose actions he cannot control by his Will, because those actions have their origin in regions of Divine Essence as ancient and as remote as is the source of the Divine Will itself: beings whose actions he cannot control by his Will, because the Will of God is subsequent in the order of nature to the sublime ground which is the spring of the activity of the human soul. [151]

Thus the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, defeats itself; for it is equivalent to the doctrine that all creation is effected by the leading forth of visible things through the energy of the Divine Will, from POTENTIALITY into ACTUALITY. God brings forth, according to his Will, from potentiality into actuality, just what he pleases; but when any human soul *is* brought into actual relations, it acts from itself, independently of God's Will, for it acts from an origin transcending God's Will.—God may drive any human soul back into potentiality, that is, may destroy its life, but while he suffers it to live he cannot alter its will by any direct exertion of power. If he wishes to alter its will, he must change the circumstances which surround it, or change its bodily conditions. In short, he cannot change the subjective action of the soul, and, if he wish to change its life, he must do it by changing the objective element with which it concurs, or by changing the instrument by which the concurrence is effected.

Thus there are two orders of Will operating in the world, the Will of God, and the Will of Man, and these, because of the Divine Ground in the Still Eternity of their spring and origin, are independent of each other. Three powers, therefore, govern the movement of all things in [152] the world: (1) Providence or the Will of God, (2) The Will of Man, (3) Destiny. The first two of these powers are uncreated; the last is a created power.

Is this Pantheism? Nay, is it not the doctrine which truly and especially avoids all Pantheism? Atheism sinks the Will of God, and the Will of Man, in the movement of Destiny: Pantheism sinks Man and Nature in the Will of God: and New England Transcendentalism sinks God and Nature in Man. The true doctrine must be sought in a Synthesis of the operation of the three great Powers.

"In the whole world (says Zoroaster) shineth a TRIAD, over which a MONAD rules."
[3+1=4]

"Meditate (says Pythagoras) on the principles I have given you, strive to put them in practice, learn to love them. They will conduct you toward divine virtue; I swear it by him who has transmitted into our souls the HOLY QUATERNARY, *source of eternal nature*."

APPENDIX

[I.]

Man is a Soul and a Body, which are united in the movement of the present terrestrial Life. It is necessary, if we would attain to the comprehension of the present condition of our lives, that we should follow up, not only the movements of *Spiritual* progress and transition which are preserved for us in our memories, but also the terms of the Serial progression of animated existence; for this progression furnishes us the key of our present *Physical* constitution. Man is neither a Soul, nor a Body, but a Soul *and* a Body, which are one in the unity of the terrestrial Life.

"I pray (says the Apostle) that your whole SPIRIT (or Life), and SOUL, and BODY, may be preserved blameless," &c.

APPENDIX

[J.]

LIFE may be well represented, in mathematical language, as a function of two variables: $LIFE = f(x, y)$. Let x represent the Free Soul, and y the circumstances furnished by Destiny. If x remain constant while y varies, the Life will derive its whole character from the movement of Destiny—this is the condition of animal life; if y remain constant while x varies, the life will derive its whole character from the free action of the vital principle—this is the life which we sometimes suppose the angels to possess. In human life, both x and y vary at every moment; thus our life is on one side free, and on the other necessitated; and every one of our acts of life, is at once free and determined.

APPENDIX

[K.]

When we see a stone fall, we do not say it is alive; for we know that it does not move itself. If, however, we should see a stone move, first in one direction, and then in another, in a manner to convince us that it moved by virtue of a power within itself, capable of originating motion, we should say, at once, that it was alive. A stone falls, however, by reason of the general force of gravitation.

All motion must be *originated* by a Living Being, for, though it may be communicated by contact, it certainly cannot originate itself. The motion of the Universe, which involves all creatures in its course, from the immense planets to the minutest insect that dwells in a drop of water, and which is too great to have been originated by any of the parts, is, rightly considered, *a sufficient proof of the existence of a LIVING GOD*. The power of gravitation may move a stone, but it is God who originates the power of gravitation.

APPENDIX

[L.]

The Mind of the Father said that all things should be cut into three. His will assented, and immediately all things were cut.

The Father mingled every spirit from this Triad.

All things are governed in the bosom of this Triad.

All things are governed and subsist in these three.

For you may conceive that all things serve these three principles.

For in the whole world shineth a Triad, over which a Monad rules.—*Oracles of Zoroaster.*

APPENDIX

[M.]

*"The age of gold, which, until now, a blind tradition has placed in the past, is before us. The future shows itself to the eyes of the nations, not as a dangerous rock, but as a harbor. Until now, men have always bequeathed the love and admiration of the past to their descendants Tormented with a desire for happiness which it seemed impossible to realize on the earth as it is, they turned their thoughts to the past or toward Heaven. They consoled themselves with chimeras. But, in spite of its leaders, of its moralists, of its artists, of its poets, the human race has grown stronger from day to day; it has developed itself in a slow, but continuous advance. It has shown to its false prophets, it has revealed, so to say, to itself, that the ages have not been lost for it, and that it has reason to hope for a future which shall be far more glorious than the times of its infancy. Society, since it has existed, has never made a single step backward. Its development has sometimes been retarded, but no power of man has ever been able to stop it. Let us leave the past to itself, for we have preached [158] a sufficient number of long and beautiful funeral orations over it. Let us not despise, but learn how to appreciate it; for it has brought us to our present condition, and it opens before us an easy road toward a most glorious future. But let us keep our eyes always turned toward the future. Let us advance, according to the fine expression of an ancient poet, as a single Man, inscribing on our pacific banners: *the Terrestrial Paradise is before us!**

—*Henri de Saint Simon.*

APPENDIX

[N.]

"The Fathers of the Church believed—and not without some appearance of reason—that the heathen derived their notions of the mystery of the Divine Nature from the Sacred Scriptures, from Moses and the Prophets. But to maintain such a proposition at the present day, now that we possess the sacred books of India, would be the height of folly. The idea of God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is the same with the idea of BEING, as it is explained in the Indian Metaphysics: and will you maintain that the Jews, who had no metaphysical science, who have left us no treatise in this department, were the original inventors of this theology? How could the Indians have borrowed their theology from the Jews, when it is evident that this theology is the mere result, and logical consequence, of their own metaphysics?

"I tell you that it is through Egypt and Plato, that the doctrine of the Word made its entrance into Christianity—has become Christianity. This [160] truth is so certain, I may say so evident, that I cannot understand how any one can have the face to deny it.

"I tell you, moreover, that all the different religions are identical, when you examine them in their metaphysical foundations, and that they differ only in form. I tell you that the Word of the Christians, is the Word of Plato, the Word of the Polytheists, the Word of Lao-Tseu, the Word of the Egyptians, the Word of the Indians. I tell you that this notion of the Word, or rather of the Trinity, or, to use the language of the Christian Fathers, of the three hypostases of God, is the foundation of all metaphysics, and consequently of all philosophy, and of all religion. To understand the Life of the *me*, of the individual being, and thence to raise ourselves to the knowledge of our relations with the Being of beings, to the knowledge of our destiny, and of our immortality, that is the true field of religion. To believe, therefore, God to be at once *one* and *triple*, *because we find this unity and this triplicity in every manifestation of Life*, whether in ourselves, or in external nature, that is what is imposed upon us as the very foundation of religion * * * *

"Admit, therefore, as you must, that we have, from this day forward, the right to conclude, solely [161] from history, and independently of any purely metaphysical demonstration, that the Christians are not the only persons who have known the true nature of God!

"Now if other men have known it before them, how can you cut off these other men, as you do, from the religious tradition? Do you dare to say that they have known the true nature of God, and that they have, notwithstanding, not known the true religion?

"Behold how incomplete and false is your tradition, limited, as it is, to the Jewish-Christian line ! Take away in thought from the human race, as you attempt to do from the true religion, India, Chaldea, Persia, and Egypt, take away Pythagoras and Plato, and say, if you dare, that Christianity could have been established, that Christianity would have

been possible! It would be like taking from a river, not only its source, but also all the tributaries which enrich it.

"On the contrary, restore to India, to Persia, to Egypt, to the Greek Philosophy, all that Christianity has borrowed from them, and say if there will remain to Christianity any thing it can [162] call its own,²⁵ that is to say, anything whose germ did not pre-exist in humanity.

"* * * * The basis of religion is eternal, for that basis is the subjective knowledge we possess [163] of LIFE: but the objective manifestation which results from this basis, is variable, and changes according to the progress of our knowledge.

"Will you maintain that religion can be the same throughout the ages! ! Can man, in all the periods of civilization, have the same objective knowledge of God and of himself! But, in this case, we would always have the same man! If you, Catholic, should think identically of God and eternal life, as a Christian of the first century would have thought you would be neither more nor less than a Christian of the first century, and you would not be a man of our times.

"Thanks to eighteen hundred years of efforts and sufferings, we are beginning to bring matter under our control, to use it as a servant; the forces of nature begin to be subjected to us, and we foresee the moment when the struggle of Man against nature, shall be terminated by the victory of intelligence. How can we, like the Christians, anathematize the world and nature, seeking an insipid life independently of the conditions of the world? A man who, like St. Paul, and all the apostles, should preach enthusiastically [164] the doctrine of the immediate end of the world, would be not only laughed at, but treated as a madman.²⁶ *Pierre Leroux.—Christianity.*

²⁵ Leroux goes too far, when he says Christianity has nothing it can call its own. It is now generally admitted, we confess, that there is no moral or religious precept whatever, written down in the gospels, which was not expressed and written down, centuries before our Lord appeared in the world. It is evident, therefore, that Christianity is not *original*, so far as its morals are concerned. Again, we think it will we [be?] established that our Lord taught no metaphysical doctrine which was not known to the Philosophers before he came—if this be done, it will be evident that Christianity is not original, so far as its metaphysical doctrine is concerned. Nevertheless Christianity is the true religion, the religion established on earth at the consummation of the time, by the direct interposition of Providence. Wherein then, consists its originality? It consists in this: our Lord came, not as a mere teacher of Metaphysics and Morality, but as a SAVIOUR—he came to save such as were lost. He brought a power and a Divine Life from the Father, which he communicates to those who believe in him. Men could understand the doctrine of Life without the crucifixion of Christ, but it was not enough to understand it; men were hungering and thirsting for the reception of the Divine Life, and it was not enough for them to know they were *dying*—they required the bread which cometh down from heaven. Our Lord came, and proclaimed to the world: " AS THE LIVING FATHER HATH SENT ME, AND I LIVE BY THE FATHER, SO HE THAT EATETH ME SPIRITUALLY, EVEN HE SHALL LIVE BY ME. John vi. 56. and this proclamation has been verified to every one that has gone to Christ, for from him is transmitted the DIVINE LIFE.

²⁶ It is probable that Leroux never heard of Father Miller.